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BANK-CREATED MONEY, MONETARY 
SOVEREIGNTY, AND THE FEDERAL DEFICIT: 
TOWARD A NEW PARADIGM IN THE 
GOVERNMENT-SPENDING DEBATE 
ASHTON S. PHILLIPS∗ 
The privilege of creating and issuing money is not only the supreme 
prerogative of Government, but it is the Government’s greatest 
creative opportunity.1 
 
∗ J.D., 2009, The George Washington University Law School.  The author wishes to 
thank the organizers of the ClassCrits VI Conference titled: Stuck in Forward? Debt, Austerity 
and the Possibilities of the Political, for providing both a welcome excuse to further explore 
this topic and a fertile environment for the development of the thesis.  He also wishes to 
extend particular thanks to Professors Tayyab Mahmud, Athena Mutua, and Charles Pouncy 
for their thoughtful comments on earlier drafts as well as the Editors of the Western New 
England Law Review for their confidence and work.  Although the author is an attorney for 
the United States government, this Article is written solely in his personal capacity and the 
opinions expressed herein are entirely his own.   
1. ROBERT L. OWEN, NATIONAL ECONOMY AND THE BANKING SYSTEM OF THE 
UNITED STATES, S. REP. NO. 39-7, at 91 (1939). 
Government possessing the power to create and issue currency and credit as 
money and enjoying the right to withdraw both currency and credit from 
circulation by taxation and otherwise, need not and should not borrow capital at 
interest as the means of financing governmental work and public enterprise.  The 
Government should create, issue, and circulate all the currency and credit needed 
to satisfy the spending power of the Government and the buying power of 
consumers.  The privilege of creating and issuing money is not only the supreme 
prerogative of Government, but it is the Government’s greatest creative 
opportunity.  
Id.  Presented by Mr. Logan on January 24, 1939, the quoted language has been characterized 
as an abstract of Abraham Lincoln’s monetary policy from Mayor McGeer’s Conquest of 
Poverty, which has been certified as correct by the Legislative Reference Service of the 
Library of Congress at the instance of Hon. Kent Keller, Member of the House of 
Representatives.   
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INTRODUCTION2 
On November 1, 2013, Congress allowed funding for the 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, the federal benefits 
program popularly known as “food stamps,” to fall for the first time in 
American history.3  This effective cut to food benefits for the neediest 
Americans is projected to save the government a relatively trifling $5 
billion in discretionary spending in fiscal year 2014 and $6 billion in 
fiscal year 2015.4  As the American Reinvestment and Recovery Act of 
2009 expires, other fiscal stimulus spending is also sunsetting, including 
a payroll tax holiday and, as of January 1, 2014,5 extended 
unemployment benefits. 
To compound matters, the Budget Control Act of 2011, passed in 
an ill-fated resolution to the 2011 debt-ceiling crisis, continues to 
mandate large, automatic, across-the-board spending cuts to the federal 
budget.  These cuts, which have come to be known as “sequestration,” 
were designed to put pressure on the Joint Select Committee on Deficit 
Reduction (better known as the Simpson-Bowles Commission) to 
negotiate a “grand [fiscal] bargain” prior to December 31, 2011.  But, no 
such “bargain” was forthcoming.  In 2013 alone, sequestration forced a 
total of $85.3 billion in cuts to federal spending.6  As amended by the 
Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013, the Budget Control Act of 2011 
continues to require another chunk of cuts each fiscal year from 2016 to 
 
2. This Article was originally submitted as part of: Stuck in Forward? Debt, Austerity 
and the Possibilities of the Political, ClassCrits VI Workshop presented by Southwestern Law 
School Law Review, November 15-16, 2013, and sponsored by The Baldy Center for Law & 
Social Policy at SUNY Buffalo and UC Davis School of Law. The full symposium published 
by Southwestern Law School Law Review is forthcoming.  See 43 SW. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2014).  
3. See Ron Nixon, House Republicans Pass Deep Cuts in Food Stamps, N.Y. TIMES 
Sept. 19, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/20/us/politics/house-passes-bill-cutting-40-
billion-from-food-stamps.html?_r=0.  
4. See Id. 
5. See Catherine Rampell, As Cuts to Food Stamps Take Effect, More Trims to Benefits 
Are Expected, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/01/us/as-cuts-to-
food-stamps-take-effect-more-trims-to-benefits-are-expected.html?_r=0. 
6.  See Dylan Matthews, The Sequester: Absolutely Everything you could Possibly Need 
to Know, in One FAQ, WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wo 
nkblog/wp/2013/02/20/the-sequester-absolutely-everything-you-could-possibly-need-to-
know-in-one-faq/.  These cuts included: 
• $42.7 billion in defense cuts (a 7.7% cut) 
• $26.1 billion in domestic discretionary cuts (a 5.1% cut) 
• $11.1 billion in Medicare cuts (a 2% cut) 
• $5.4 billion in other mandatory cuts (a 5.2% cut) 
Id. 
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2023 until $1.5 trillion is cut from the annual federal budget.7  
We are told that these cuts are necessary to balance the budget.  
When proponents of these and other fiscal austerity measures are pressed 
to explain why balancing the budget is so essential (especially in the 
aftermath of the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression), we 
are frequently offered only misleading platitudes.8  For example, the 
preamble to the Simpson-Bowles Commission Report, ominously titled 
“The Moment of Truth,” explains that deficit reduction is necessary 
because “America cannot be great if we go broke” and “we have a 
patriotic duty to keep the promise of America to give our children and 
grandchildren a better life.”9  The report’s authors, including both 
Republican and Democratic Senators,10 do not explain how federal 
 
7. See id.  While the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013, which President Obama signed into 
law on December 26, 2013, has provided a total of $63 billion in “sequester relief” for fiscal 
years 2014 and 2015, it does not provide permanent relief or authorize a net reduction in the 
Budget Control Act of 2011’s mandatory spending cuts.  The new Act replaces the part of the 
sequestration cuts previously scheduled to take effect in fiscal years 2014 and 2015 with $28 
billion in “mandatory-sequester extension[s]” for fiscal years 2022 and 2023 and other 
“savings.”  Summary of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013, U.S. HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET, (Dec. 10, 2013), available at http://budge 
t.house.gov/uploadedfiles/bba2013summary.pdf; H.R.J. Res. 59-2, 113th Cong. § 101 (2013), 
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-113hjres59enr/pdf/BILLS-113hjres59enr 
.pdf.  The intended effect of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 is to reduce deficit spending 
by an additional $20 to $23 billion on top of those reductions mandated by the Budget Control 
Act of 2011.  Id. 
8. This is not a new phenomenon.  John Maynard Keynes, the economic darling of 
many Democratic politicians since the New Deal and Richard (“we are all Keynesians now”) 
Nixon, famously said “we must go on pretending that fair is foul and foul is fair; for foul is 
useful and fair is not.”  ROBERT SKIDELSKY, KEYNES 47 (Oxford 1996) (discussing Keynes’ 
rejection of socialism as described in his essay, Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, 
published in 1930). 
9. JOINT COMM’N ON FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY, THE MOMENT OF TRUTH: REPORT OF 
THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY AND REFORM (Dec. 2010) 
[hereinafter JOINT COMM’N REPORT], http://www.fiscalcommission.gov/sites/fiscalcommissio 
n.gov/files/documents/TheMomentofTruth12_1_2010.pdf (recommending that Congress cap 
revenue at 21% of GDP by 2022 and cap spending at 21% of GDP “eventually” and 
containing such other nuggets of wisdom as “the most significant threat to our national 
security is our debt”). 
10. While the eighteen members of the Joint Commission included Democratic and 
Republican Senators, Representatives, and other stakeholders, only eleven of the eighteen 
members endorsed “The Moment of Truth” report.  Endorsers included Democratic Senators 
and Representatives and Republican Senators.  All three House Republicans declined to 
endorse the report, including Representative Paul Ryan.  Commission member Andy Stern, 
former President of the Service Employees International Union, also declined to endorse the 
report.  Because the report failed to garner fourteen yes votes, it was not automatically 
submitted to Congress for a vote.  See In a 11-7 Tally, the Fiscal Commission Falls Short on 
Votes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/12/03/us/politics 
/deficit-commission-vote.html?_r=0. 
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spending threatens our children’s promise of a better life or how 
America can “go broke.”  Instead, they turn to the intellectually fraught 
“pocketbook” metaphor, proclaiming: 
Ever since the economic downturn, families across the country have 
huddled around kitchen tables, making tough choices about what 
they hold most dear and what they can learn to live without.  They 
expect and deserve their leaders to do the same.  The American 
people are counting on us to put politics aside, pull together not pull 
apart, and agree on a plan to live within our means and make 
America strong for the long haul.11 
The problem with this parable and related anxiety over the federal 
deficit12 is that the United States is not a family sitting around a kitchen 
table contemplating its credit card debt.  Instead, as will be discussed 
more fully in Part I, the United States is a monetary sovereign with the 
Constitutional power to coin money and regulate the value thereof.13  As 
such, the Supreme Court made clear more than 125 years ago that the 
Constitution grants Congress the power to print money backed by 
nothing and force people to accept that fiat money as legal tender for the 
payment of the federal government’s (and everyone else’s) debts.14  If an 
entity can print money and force its creditors to accept that money in 
 
11. JOINT COMM’N REPORT, supra note 9, at 6.  Some have suggested, echoing Max 
Weber’s seminal work on The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, that this kind of 
moralizing over public debt stems from Protestant religious tradition and its characterization 
of personal debt as sinful.  See, e.g., Chris Bowlby, The Eurozone’s Religious Faultline, BBC 
NEWS (July 18, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-18789154 (noting that European 
countries with majority Protestant populations also tend to be those countries most in favor of 
austerity measures); see also, DAVID GRAEBER, DEBT: THE FIRST 5,000 YEARS 59 (2012) 
(noting that in all Indo-European languages, words for “debt” are etymologically related to 
those for “sin” or “guilt”). 
12. Perpetually exposed to this kind of rhetoric, the public has come to believe that the 
federal debt and deficit are urgent and serious problems.  In a March 2013 Gallup Poll, 61% of 
respondents stated that they personally worry about federal spending and budget deficit a 
“great deal.”  21% worried a “fair amount.”  Only 15% worried “not at all” or “only a little.”  
See Federal Budget Deficit, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/147626/Federal-Budget-
Deficit.aspx (last visited May 14, 2014).  In a January 2013 Gallup Poll asking respondents to 
identify “the most important problem facing this country today,” the second most common 
response was the federal budget deficit with 20%, trailing only “the economy in general” 
(21%), and surpassing unemployment (16%) for the first time since 2009.  See Frank 




13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (listing as one of Congress’s enumerated powers, the 
power: “[t]o coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard 
of Weights and Measures”).  
14. See Juilliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421, 451 (1884) (discussed infra Part I.A). 
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payment of its debts, that entity cannot really “go broke.”  Popular 
discourse to the contrary notwithstanding, this is no secret.  Former 
Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan, for example, has 
explained: “[A] government cannot become insolvent with respect to 
obligations in its own currency.  A fiat money system, like the ones we 
have today, can produce such claims [as those created against the 
government when it creates money] without limit.”15 
Of course, any mention of government money creation as a solution 
to popular anxiety over the federal deficit is usually snuffed out 
immediately with one word: inflation.  Maybe, the government could 
print money to finance its expenses, the narrative goes, but such an 
approach would surely be short-lived because any government printing 
money to pay its bills would quickly destroy the value of its currency 
(and thereby lose its power to print anything of value) by triggering 
runaway-inflation.  So we are told, but the analysis is not so simple. 
For one thing, inflation is not a necessary result of governments 
spending printed money.  Inflation occurs only when increases in the 
money supply over a particular time period exceed increases in the real 
value of the economy over the same time period.16  Thus, if the 
government spends its printed money on projects that increase Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), including, for example, improvements in 
 
15. Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Board Of Governors Of The Fed. Reserve Sys., 
Remarks on Cent. Banking and Global Fin. at The Catholic Univ. Leuven, Leuven, Belg. 2 
(Jan. 14, 1997) (transcript available through Westlaw, at 1997 WL 10937 (F.R.B.)).  Of 
course, Congress arguably can and has ordered the Treasury via statute to stop issuing new 
debt instruments whenever the numeric value of outstanding debt equals some arbitrary 
number.  Even recognizing this statutory limitation, America cannot “go broke” in the same 
way a natural person can.  In the case of a debt-ceiling induced default, Congress would have 
defaulted on its debts and other obligations (arguably in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment) not because the government itself lacks the power to pay its bills as they become 
due, but because Congress refuses to exercise its power to do so.  For more on the relevance of 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Public Debts clause to the debt-ceiling debacle, see Neil H. 
Buchanan & Michael C. Dorf, How to Choose the Least Unconstitutional Option: Lessons for 
the President (and Others) from the Debt Ceiling Standoff, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1175, 1189 
(2012). 
16. See, e.g., ROGER LEROY MILLER & ROBERT W. PULSINELLI, MODERN MONEY AND 
BANKING 437–40 (Scott D. Stratford 2d ed. 1989) (discussing general theories of inflation 
including the theory that inflation is a monetary phenomenon and noting that proponents on 
this theory conclude that “inflation results when the money supply increases faster than output 
[GDP] increases”) (emphasis added); DAVID A. MOSS, A CONCISE GUIDE TO 
MACROECONOMICS: WHAT MANAGERS, EXECUTIVES, AND STUDENTS NEED TO KNOW 38 
(2007) (“Money growth . . . tends to drive up the price level.  With more cash in their pockets 
and bank accounts, consumers often find new reasons to buy things.  But unless the supply of 
goods and services has increased in the meantime, the consumers’ mounting demand for 
products will simply bid up prices, thus stoking inflation.  Economists sometimes say that 
inflation rises when ‘too much money is chasing too few goods.’”) (emphasis added). 
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infrastructure, energy production, education, or healthcare technology, 
the inflationary effect of printing the money to pay for these projects 
should be tempered or even eliminated to the extent that the increase in 
the real value of the economy is proportionate to the increase in the 
money supply.17  By contrast, if a government arbitrarily sprinkles new 
money into the economy, the increase in the money supply may 
stimulate economic activity in the short run, but unless the new money 
causes or at least corresponds with growth in the real value of the 
economy, the arbitrary money printing will likely cause inflation, at least 
in the long run.18  Similarly, any action that leads to the net destruction 
of real value in an economy (e.g., a domestic war or a natural disaster 
 
17. Introductory economics courses teach students about these dynamics of inflation 
with the equation of exchange: MV = PQ, where: 
M is the nominal value of money; 
V is the velocity of money in final expenditures; 
P is the general price level; and  
Q is an index of the real value of final expenditures (as a proxy for Gross Domestic 
Product, or the real value of the economy). 
While monetarists, such as Milton Friedman, famously relied on this equation to justify their 
view that the quantity of money directly determined the price of goods and services (i.e. 
inflation), that interpretation depends on the assumption that neither the real value of the 
economy nor the velocity of money could be affected by increases or decreases to the money 
supply.  While Q and V may remain fairly constant when increases or decreases in the money 
supply are affected by the Federal Reserve’s open market operations, the equation of exchange 
could just as easily describe the principle cited.  If the quantity of the real value of the 
economy (Q) increases, as a result of how the created money is spent, and the nominal 
quantity of money in the economy (M) increases in proportion to the increase in the real value 
of the economy (Q), the general price levels in the economy (P) should remain the same.  If 
the quantity of money (M) is increased, but, due to the way the created money is spent, there 
is no increase in the real value of the economy (Q), price levels (P) will rise, assuming the 
velocity of money (V) remains constant.  For a thoughtful discussion of the history, debated 
meaning, and accuracy of the “quantity theory of money,” see Mark Blaug, Why is the 
Quantity Theory of Money the Oldest Surviving Theory in Economics?, in THE QUANTITY 
THEORY OF MONEY: FROM LOCKE TO KEYNES AND FRIEDMAN 27-49 (Edward Elgar 1995).  
Blaug concludes that “[m]oney . . . can affect both output and prices in the short run and it 
may even affect output in the long run, depending on how and at what rate the extra money is 
injected into the economy.”  Id. at 43 (emphasis added). 
18. Even John Maynard Keynes, the economist most often associated with the position 
that governments should use both fiscal deficit spending and monetary policy to stimulate the 
economy and worry about deficits and inflation later, conceded that arbitrary money creation 
could result in inflation in the long run.  SKIDELSKY, supra note 8, at 122 (“So long as there is 
unemployment, employment will change in the same proportion as the quantity of money; and 
when there is full employment, prices will change in the same proportion as the quantity of 
money.”) (emphasis added).  Of course, Keynes is also famous for discounting the 
significance of long run economic effects, noting “in the long run, we’re all dead.”  See JOHN 
MAYNARD KEYNES, A TRACT ON MONETARY REFORM 79-80 (1923) (“But this long run is a 
misleading guide to current affairs.  In the long run we are all dead.  Economists set 
themselves too easy, too useless a task if in tempestuous seasons they can only tell us that 
when the storm is long past the ocean is flat again.”). 
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without corresponding reconstruction efforts) could cause inflation 
without any increase in the volume of money because the system would 
have the same amount of money “chasing” fewer goods and services.19  
In short, whether printing money causes price inflation depends not 
simply, if at all, on the quantity of money created but on how the printed 
money is spent. 
Moreover, even if inflation sometimes results from creating money, 
it is not necessarily true that the United States would experience higher 
rates of inflation if Congress were directly to finance some of its 
expenditures with printed money because, as nearly all economics 
students (and startlingly few lawyers) know, and as I will explore further 
in Part II, the Federal Reserve and private commercial banks currently 
enjoy the power to create and spend or loan into existence virtually 
unlimited amounts of new money.  Because the Constitution gives 
Congress plenary control over the creation of money, however, Congress 
could modify the status quo at any time both: (1) to print money to 
directly finance deficit spending and (2) to directly or indirectly control 
the overall quantity of money created in the economy, including money 
created by the Federal Reserve and private banks, such that no net 
change in the quantity of created money need result from Congress’s 
direct money creation. 
As such, and as explored in Part III, the question presented to 
Congress and brought into sharp relief in the present moment of 
economic crisis, debt-ceiling standoffs, government shutdowns, food 
stamp cuts, increasing economic inequality, sequestration, quantitative 
easing, credit bubbles, and liquidity traps, is not how America can learn 
to “live within its means,” or whether members of Congress can make 
the “tough choices about what they hold most dear and what they can 
learn to live without,” but: how the sovereign power to create money 
should be exercised and (crucially) who should benefit from the exercise 
of that power? 
Rather than endorsing a particular answer to this monumental 
policy question, Part III explores some of the interests, arguments, and 
 
19. For an alternative, but not necessarily mutually exclusive, view of the causes of 
inflation, see HETERODOX MACROECONOMICS: KEYNES, MARX AND GLOBALIZATION 30-31 
(Jonathan P. Goldstein & Michael G. Hillard eds., 2009) [hereinafter HETERODOX] (“Inflation 
is a non-monetary phenomenon in the sense that changes in the stock of money do not 
determine the rate of inflation in any causal sense, but rather the rate of change of the stock of 
money (endogenously) adjusts to the pace of inflation” and characterizing inflationary 
pressure as a product of the struggle over income shares, changes in aggregate demand 
without corresponding changes in aggregate supply, and “cost-push factors” including 
particularly changes from the foreign sector affecting import prices and exchange rates). 
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proposals Congress and voters would do well to consider when 
answering this question and concludes with the more limited proposition 
that the Constitution vests the responsibility for determining the winners 
and losers of the fiscal/monetary system squarely in Congress’s hands 
and that an honest and informed evaluation of Congress’s choices 
relating to the federal debt must at the least acknowledge and incorporate 
the following, perhaps inconvenient, realities: (1) Congress has the 
constitutional power to create fiat money and has done so in the past; (2) 
Congress has delegated this power to the Federal Reserve, which thereby 
enjoys the practically unlimited power to create legal tender money; (3) 
the Federal Reserve is currently exercising that power to “ease” billions 
of dollars in new money into existence per year; (4) private banks enjoy 
the power to transform every dollar the Federal Reserve creates into ten 
dollars (or more) of legally protected money; (5) this fiscal/monetary 
system is not economically or politically neutral in that it creates certain 
predictable winners and losers; and (6) alternative models exist that 
would allow Congress to exercise its sovereign power to create money 
without risking net increases in the currently accepted rates of inflation, 
including models that leave the Federal Reserve Act entirely in place.20 
 
20. Those familiar with the history of monetary theory and philosophy will note that 
many writers have spent a significant amount of energy wrestling with the precise meaning of 
“money.”  These writers attempt to define money by its function, noting that “money” 
operates as:  (1) a medium of exchange; (2) a measure of value or a standard for contractual 
obligations; (3) a store of value or wealth; and (4) a unit of account.  See, e.g., CHARLES 
PROCTOR, MANN ON THE LEGAL ASPECT OF MONEY 10 (6th ed. 2005); THOMAS CRUMP, THE 
PHENOMENON OF MONEY 1-31 (Routledge & Kegan Paul eds., 1981) (discussing these 
attributes of money, the nature of money more broadly, and characterizing “money” as a 
cultural tautology).  These discussions, while interesting, are not particularly important to this 
work or to the fiscal anxiety gripping the nation.  “Money” for purposes of this Article means 
simply: (1) legal tender, or whatever fungible unit or item (be it paper note, coin, electronic 
credit entry, bead, shell, etc.) the State vows to accept for the satisfaction of public debts and 
orders individuals to accept for the satisfaction of private debts; and (2) that bank-created 
money that the State insures through depository insurance and sanctions through statutory 
reserve rates.  Put more simply, “money” is whatever the State says it is.  For those keeping 
track, I am not the first to take this State-centric approach to the nature of money.  See, e.g., L. 
Randall Wray, Alternative Approaches to Money, 11 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 29, 39-44 
(2010) (characterizing those who emphasize the central role of the nation-state in the 
production and regulation of money as advocating the “state theory of money” and identifying 
John Maynard Keynes and A. Mitchell Innes as proponents); GRAEBER, supra note 11, at 47-
49 (discussing G.F. Knapp’s State Theory of Money as foundational to this School).  
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I. CONGRESS’S MONETARY POWERS AND POLICY 
A.  As a Monetary Sovereign, Congress Has the Constitutional Power 
to Create Money 
As a matter of Constitutional law, the federal government need not 
borrow money nor raise revenue through taxation to pay its bills.  
Although the Constitution prohibits state governments from coining 
money, issuing “Bills of Credit,” or making anything other than “gold 
and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts,” nothing in the 
Constitution prohibits the federal government from issuing paper money 
or other fiat currency (paper, coin, or electronic).21  Some have disagreed 
with this conclusion, citing the Founders’ purported abhorrence of paper 
money,22 but, as will be discussed presently, the Supreme Court 
sanctioned the view that Congress can issue legal tender to fund its 
expenditures, even if that money is not backed by any commodity, as 
early as 1884. 
Relying on the Necessary and Proper Clause and Congress’s 
various enumerated powers relating to money and federal debt, the 
Supreme Court in Julian v. Greenman (the most sweeping of the famous 
Civil War Era Legal-Tender Cases) upheld Congress’s power to issue 
fiat “greenbacks” and to force individuals to accept that fiat currency in 
satisfaction of private debts.23  In reaching this conclusion, the Court 
 
21. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (granting Congress the power to coin money and 
regulate the value thereof), with id. § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . coin Money; emit Bills of 
Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts . . . .”).  
22. See, e.g., Ali Khan, The Evolution of Money: A Story of Constitutional Nullification, 
67 U. CIN. L. REV. 393, 407 (1999) (“Finally, it can be said with ‘moral certainty’ that the 
framers of the Constitution prohibited making any paper bills a legal tender money.”).  But 
see, e.g., Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Thomas Ruston (Oct. 9, 1780), in 33 THE PAPERS 
OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, July 1 through November 15, 1780, 390, 390-92 (Barbara B. Oberg 
ed., Yale Univ. Press 1997), available at http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-
33-02-0331 (“[The Continental Congress] is, as you well suppose not well skilled in 
Financing. But their Deficiency in Knowledge has been amply supply’d by Good Luck.  They 
issued an immence Quantity of Paper Bills, to pay, clothe, arm & feed their Troops, & fit out 
Ships, and with this Paper, without Taxes for the first three Years, they fought & baffled one 
of the most powerful Nations of Europe.  They hoped notwithstanding its Quantity to have 
kept up the Value of their Paper.  In this they were mistaken.  It depreciated gradually.  But 
this Depreciation, tho’ in some Circumstances inconvenient, has had the general good and 
great Effect, of operating as a Tax, and perhaps the most equal of all Taxes, since it 
depreciated in the Hands of the Holders of the Money, and thereby taxed them in proportion to 
the Sums they hold and the Time they held it, which is generally in proportion to Mens 
Wealth.”). 
23. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 2, 5, and 18 (“The Congress shall have Power to 
lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the 
common [defense] and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and 
Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States; To borrow Money on the credit of the 
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characterized this monetary power as necessary and inherent to the 
United States’ sovereignty, stating: 
It appears to us to follow, as a logical and necessary consequence, 
that congress has the power to issue the obligations of the United 
States in such form, and to impress upon them such qualities as 
currency for the purchase of merchandise and the payment of debts, 
as accord with the usage of sovereign governments.  The power, as 
incident to the power of borrowing money, and issuing bills or notes 
of the government for money borrowed, of impressing upon those 
bills or notes the quality of being a legal tender for the payment of 
private debts, was a power universally understood to belong to 
sovereignty, in Europe and America, at the time of the framing and 
adoption of the constitution of the United States . . . . The exercise of 
this power not being prohibited to congress by the constitution, it is 
included in the power expressly granted to borrow money on the 
credit of the United States.24 
Justice Fields, writing in dissent, took the logic of the majority 
opinion to its necessary conclusion, arguing (aptly enough for this 
Article, albeit in apparent horror): if the majority is right, then there is no 
sense in paying “interest on the millions of dollars of bonds now due, 
when Congress can in one day make the money to pay the principal.”25 
The Civil War era Supreme Court was not the first to recognize the 
relationship between the power to create money and sovereignty.26  
Indeed, some scholars estimate that the notion of monetary sovereignty 
predates that of political sovereignty by thousands of years, as priests 
and rulers from various ancient civilizations claimed the exclusive power 
 
United States; . . . To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the 
Standard of Weights and Measures . . . [a]nd To make all Laws which shall be necessary and 
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this 
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer 
thereof.”). 
24. The Legal-Tender Cases, 110 U.S. 421, 447-48 (1884).  For a more modern 
articulation of this view, see Naamloze Vennootschap Suikerfabriek ‘Wono-Aseh’ v. Chase 
Nat’l Bank of N.Y., 111 F. Supp. 833, 845 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (“Control of the national currency 
and of foreign exchange is a necessary attribute of sovereignty.”).  
25. Legal-Tender Cases, 110 U.S. at 470 (Field, J., dissenting). 
26. It was also not the last.  In 1935, the Supreme Court again affirmed Congress’s 
“broad and comprehensive national authority over the subjects of revenue, finance, and 
currency,” in Norman v. Balt. & Oh. R.R. Co. (The Gold Clause Cases), 294 U.S. 240, 303 
(1935).  There, the Court, relying on Greenman and the aggregate of the powers granted to the 
Congress by the Constitution, upheld a 1933 Joint Resolution of Congress declaring “gold 
clauses” in private contracts, which purported to require parties to pay contractual obligations 
in gold, void as against public policy.  See, e.g., id. at 312.  Because Congress’s conclusion 
that these clauses interfered with its broad power to set monetary policy was not arbitrary or 
capricious, the Court upheld the Joint Resolution.  Id. at 417–20.  
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to create money long before rulers developed the notion of sovereign 
nation-states.27  Indeed, the connection between sovereignty and 
monetary power is so well established that the State’s sovereignty over 
its own currency is “traditionally recognized by public international 
law.”28 
Recent history bears out the wisdom of this view, with Greece and 
the other European Union member nations now facing external demands 
to implement so-called “Austerity Programs” as the most powerful 
examples.  Prior to joining the euro area, Greece (like any other 
monetary sovereign) retained the power to create money to pay for its 
expenses, be they generous pension programs or public transportation 
projects, and to collect otherwise impossibly low tax revenues.29  Within 
its boundaries, Greece (again, like any other monetary sovereign) had the 
power to give this created currency value by pledging to accept the 
currency in satisfaction of tax liabilities to the State and to require (or at 
least order) all citizens to accept the currency in satisfaction of private 
debts.  By joining the euro area, Greece gave up this sovereign power to 
create money and with it the power to deficit spend without debt in 
exchange for the prestige of full membership in the European Union and 
the convenience and reduced transaction costs associated with a single 
European currency.30  Many Greeks realized only too late the value of 
the power they gave up.31 
 
27. ROSA MARIA LASTRA, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL MONETARY 
STABILITY 4-14 (2006) (listing Sumer, India, Babylon, Persia, Egypt, and Rome as ancient 
civilizations with rulers or priests proclaiming the power to create money and providing a 
brief history of the development of the concept of political sovereignty in western civilization, 
locating the acceptance of the concept in 1648 with the Treaty of Westphalia); see also David 
Glasner, An Evolutionary Theory of the State Monopoly over Money, in MONEY AND THE 
NATION STATE: THE FINANCIAL REVOLUTION, GOVERNMENT AND THE WORLD MONETARY 
SYSTEM 21-45 (Kevin Dowd & Richard H. Timberlake, Jr. eds., 1998) (noting the relationship 
between state security and the state monopoly over money, “[i]n the ancient world . . . states 
that allowed private mints to operate were vulnerable to takeover by owners of private mints 
who could raise large sums of money quickly to finance their takeovers”).  
28. PROCTOR, supra note 20, at § 19:02.  
29. For a detailed discussion of the difference between the spending powers of 
monetary sovereigns, like the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan, and monetary 
non-sovereigns, including all members of the euro area, see L. RANDALL WRAY, MODERN 
MONEY THEORY: A PRIMER ON MACROECONOMICS FOR SOVEREIGN MONETARY SYSTEMS 
141-43, 169-85 (2012).   
30. For a discussion of the advent of the European Monetary Union as an example of 
voluntary or consensual limitations of monetary sovereignty, see LASTRA, supra note 26, at 
27- 29 (noting that “[t]he adoption of a single currency, the euro, and the creation of the 
European System of Central Banks with responsibility to formulate and implement the 
monetary policy of the Community has been described as ‘the most profound limitation to 
monetary sovereignty ever to be agreed by sovereign states’”). 
31. For a critical take on the advent of the single currency market in the EU and its 
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The position of less-than-sovereign American states and 
municipalities is not unlike that of Greece in the wake of the European 
currency union, with similar results.  As noted earlier, the United States 
Constitution forbids American cities and states from exercising 
Congress’s sovereign power to create money by forbidding states from 
issuing “Bills of Credit” or making anything other than gold or silver 
coin legal tender.  As a direct result, unlike the federal government 
American states and municipalities, including most recently and 
infamously the city of Detroit, actually can “go broke.”32 
B.  Congress Has and Does, to a Limited Degree, Directly Issue Fiat 
Money to Finance Government Expenses. 
Not only does Congress have the power to unilaterally issue and 
spend money backed by nothing other than its sovereignty, it has done so 
before and continues to do so to a limited degree even now.  After the 
outbreak of the Civil War, Congress authorized three issues of non-
interest-bearing United States Notes convertible to nothing.  These U.S. 
Notes, which became known as “greenbacks” due to the distinctive 
green ink used in their manufacture, were the paper money at issue in the 
Legal-Tender Cases discussed above.33 
Although these greenbacks were initially justified as a necessary 
evil to finance the war, they became a politically popular and lasting part 
 
resulting effects on the sovereignty of member nations, including Greece, see PAUL CRAIG 
ROBERTS, THE FAILURE OF LAISSEZ FAIRE CAPITALISM 159-74 (2013) (discussing the Greek 
public revolt, complete with street protests and Molotov cocktails, after a severe austerity 
program, including wage, pension, and employment reductions, and the privatization of state 
lottery, municipal water companies, and ports, was proposed).   
32. Of course, the federal government can and has bailed out American cities, just as it 
bailed out banks and financial institutions (often with created money) in the wake of the 2008 
financial crisis.  For example, in 1975, the federal government famously bailed out New York 
City with $2.3 billion of seasonal financing to help prevent it from declaring bankruptcy.  
Gretchen Morgenson, Lessons from Bailout of New York, N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.co 
m/2008/05/11/business/worldbusiness/11iht-morg12.1.12762783.html (last visited May 14, 
2014).  For a review of the Federal Reserve’s $16 trillion bailout of private banks and 
corporations including foreign-owned banks between 2008 and 2010, see U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-11-696, FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: OPPORTUNITIES EXIST 
TO STRENGTHEN POLICIES AND PROCESSES FOR MANAGING EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE 131 
(July 2011), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11696.pdf. 
33. See JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, MONEY: WHENCE IT CAME, WHERE IT WENT 84-
100 (1975); see also WILLIAM F. HIXSON, TRIUMPH OF THE BANKERS: MONEY AND BANKING 
IN THE EIGHTEENTH AND NINETEENTH CENTURIES 132 (1993) (characterizing Congress’s 
situation in 1862, in the face of enormous increases in civilian and military expenditures, as 
requiring a choice between “inconvertible government created money [and] inconvertible 
bank created money” and concluding that Congress wisely chose the former, at least at that 
historical moment).  
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of United States currency.34  In response to efforts to retire the 
greenbacks from circulation following the end of the Civil War, a 
national political party calling itself the Greenback Party (or sometimes 
the Greenback Labor Party) formed.35  This Party, comprised mostly of 
farmers who believed they would benefit from inflation and increased 
government spending, argued that the greenback issue should be 
expanded rather than retired because it was the sole and sacred role of 
the government, not private banks, to issue money.  In the election of 
1878, the Party received more than a million votes and elected fourteen 
congressmen.36  Although it was not successful in convincing Congress 
to prohibit bank created money and replace it with greenbacks, the Party 
has been credited with at least convincing Congress and “hard money” 
advocates to abandon their efforts to retire the existing issue of 
greenbacks.37 
This compromise lasted.  To this day, Congress continues to 
authorize the Treasury to maintain a permanent issue of $300 million in 
non-interest bearing, inconvertible U.S. Treasury Notes (i.e., 
greenbacks) the same volume authorized in 1878.38  These United States 
 
34. GALBRAITH, supra note 33, at 84-100.  In 1866, with the immediate need for war 
financing subsided, Congress began retiring greenbacks from circulation.  It halted the 
retirement in 1868 in response to political pressure, especially from farmers who – not 
necessarily incorrectly – blamed concurrent deflation and the related increase in the real cost 
of their debt burdens on the retirement of the paper money.  In 1871 and 1872, the Treasury 
reversed course authorizing a few million increase in the issue of greenbacks.  In 1874, 
Congress authorized the greenback circulation at a permanent total of $400 million.  Ulysses 
S. Grant vetoed the measure stating: “I am not a believer in any artificial method of making 
paper money equal to coin, when the coin is not owned or held ready to redeem the promises 
to pay.”  Id. at 96. 
35. GALBRAITH, supra note 33, at 96-97.  
36. GALBRAITH, supra note 33, at 97. 
37. The Democratic Party also adopted a similar plan in 1867, known as the Pendleton 
Plan, which proposed, inter alia, replacement of the national bank notes with greenbacks.  For 
more information on the Pendleton Plan, see generally Max L. Shipley, The Background and 
Legal Aspects of the Pendleton Plan, 24 MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV. 329 (Dec. 1937), available 
at http://www.jstor.org/stable/1891818 (the Pendleton Plan involved demands for the payment 
of the five-twenty bonds in greenbacks, substitution of greenbacks for national bank notes, 
and discontinuation of the policy of withdrawing greenbacks from circulation, with possibly 
some slight inflation of the currency). 
38. The statute reads: 
(a) The Secretary of the Treasury may issue United States currency notes. The 
notes— 
(1) are payable to bearer; and 
(2) shall be in a form and in denominations of at least one dollar that the 
Secretary prescribes. 
(b) The amount of United States currency notes outstanding and in circulation— 
(1) may not be more than $300,000,000; and 
(2) may not be held or used for a reserve. 
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Notes are still in circulation and are still legal tender, redeemable at par 
for any Federal Reserve Note.39  As of December 2012, the U.S. 
Treasury calculated that $239 million in United States Notes, or 
greenbacks, were in circulation.40 
Congress also continues to authorize the U.S. Treasury to issue 
coin, in various quantities and denominations.41  One such coinage 
statute,42 authorizing the Treasury to create platinum coins in any 
denomination, gave rise to the recent “$3 Trillion Coin” proposals.  
 
31 U.S.C. § 5115 (2013). 
39. The Treasury website explains it like this:  
     United States Notes (characterized by a red seal and serial number) were the first 
national currency, authorized by the Legal Tender Act of 1862 and began circulating 
during the Civil War.  The Treasury Department issued these notes directly into 
circulation, and they are obligations of the United States Government.  The issuance 
of United States Notes is subject to limitations established by Congress.  It 
established a statutory limitation of $300 million on the amount of United States 
Notes authorized to be outstanding and in circulation.  While this was a significant 
figure in Civil War days, it is now a very small fraction of the total currency in 
circulation in the United States. 
    Both United States Notes and Federal Reserve Notes are parts of our national 
currency and both are legal tender.  They circulate as money in the same way.  
However, the issuing authority for them comes from different statutes.  United 
States Notes were redeemable in gold until 1933, when the United States abandoned 
the gold standard.  Since then, both currencies have served essentially the same 
purpose, and have had the same value.  
Resource Center: Legal Tender Status, U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY [hereinafter U.S. DEPT. 
OF THE TREASURY], http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/faqs/currency/pages/legal-
tender.aspx (last visited May 4, 2014); see also 31 U.S.C. § 5103 (2013) (“United States coins 
and currency (including Federal reserve notes and circulating notes of Federal reserve banks 
and national banks) are legal tender for all debts, public charges, taxes, and dues. Foreign gold 
or silver coins are not legal tender for debts.”); id. § 5119 (listing United States currency 
notes, including those issued under the Legal Tender Acts as public debts bearing no interest).  
40. BUREAU OF THE PUB. DEBT, MONTHLY STATEMENT OF THE PUBLIC DEBT OF THE 
UNITED STATES (Dec. 31, 2012), available at http://www.treasurydirect.gov/govt/reports/pd 
/mspd/2012/opdm122012.pdf.  Thus, even though Congress has authorized the Treasury to 
maintain a circulation of $300 million in United States Notes, the Treasury has not done so, 
declining to place any new U.S. Notes in circulation since 1971.  As explanation, the Treasury 
states: “Because United States Notes serve no function that is not already adequately served 
by Federal Reserve Notes, their issuance was discontinued, and none have been placed in to 
circulation since January 21, 1971.”  U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, supra note 39.  Of course, 
there is one major “function” United States Notes serve that Federal Reserve Notes do not: 
United States Notes provide direct revenue to the federal government.  See Bruce G. 
Carruthers & Sarah Babb, The Color of Money and the Nature of Value: Greenbacks and Gold 
in Post-Bellum America, 101 AM. J. SOC. 1556, 1558 (1996); see also R. CHRISTOPHER 
WHALEN, INFLATED: HOW MONEY AND DEBT BUILT THE AMERICAN DREAM 29-61 (1959). 
41. 31 U.S.C. §§ 5111-5112 (2013). 
42. Id. § 5112 (k) (“The Secretary may mint and issue platinum bullion coins and proof 
platinum coins in accordance with such specifications, designs, varieties, quantities, 
denominations, and inscriptions as the Secretary, in the Secretary’s discretion, may prescribe 
from time to time.”); see also id. § 5112 (h) (“The coins issued under this title shall be legal 
tender as provided in section 5103 of this title.”). 
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These proposals, which were endorsed by various commentators, 
including New York Times columnist and Nobel Prize-winning 
economist, Paul Krugman, suggested that rather than defaulting on 
federal obligations, the Treasury could and should coin a trillion dollar 
platinum coin to pay the government’s expenses in the event Congress 
refused to increase the statutory debt-ceiling.43 
While coinage of such a high denomination coin would be highly 
unusual, especially in the absence of clear Congressional direction to 
produce trillion-dollar platinum coins, it is not unusual for Congress to 
enjoy some seigniorage revenue from the Treasury’s manufacture and 
sale of coin.44  Here is how it works: Congress authorizes the Treasury to 
mint coins in various quantities and denominations.  The U.S. Mint then 
sells these coins to the Federal Reserve if directed by statute (otherwise 
it sells the coins to the public), which credits the Treasury’s account at 
the Federal Reserve with money equal to the nominal or face value of 
the coin.45  The difference between the cost of producing these coins and 
the face value of the coins (i.e., the “seigniorage”) is profit for the 
government.46 
Thus, not only does Congress have the constitutional power to 
directly finance its expenditures with created money, it has done so 
 
43. Compare Paul Krugman, Be Ready to Mint That Coin, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2013, 
http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/01/07/be-ready-to-mint-that-coin/?_r=0, and Evan 
Soltas, Economics Is Platinum: What the Trillion-Dollar Coin Teaches Us, BLOOMBERG.COM 
(Jan. 14, 2013, 4:20 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-14/economics-is-
platinum-what-the-trillion-dollar-coin-teaches-us.html, and Ezra Klein, Former Head of U.S. 
Mint: The Platinum Coin Option Would Work, WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 2013, http://www.washi 
ngtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/01/08/former-head-of-u-s-mint-the-platinum-coin-
option-would-work/, with Ezra Klein, Why We Won’t Mint the Coin, Why We Can’t Just Pay 
Off the Bonds, and Other Scary Debt-Ceiling Facts, WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 2013, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/10/03/why-we-wont-mint-the-
coin-why-we-cant-just-pay-off-bonds-and-other-scary-debt-ceiling-facts/, and Ezra Klein, 
Treasury: We Won’t Mint a Platinum Coin to Sidestep the Debt Ceiling, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 
2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/01/12/treasu 
ry-we-wont-mint-a-platinum-coin-to-sidestep-the-debt-ceiling/.  
44. See Keeley McCarty, Recent Developments, Flip the Coin to the Fed: A Comment 
on the Dysfunctional Relationship Among the Federal Reserve System, Congress, and the 
United States Mint, 64 ADMIN. L. REV. 315, 321 (2012) (concluding that the Federal Reserve 
should have control over coin as well as bills) (“The Federal Reserve purchases coins from the 
Mint at face value, generating an immediate profit for the Mint and, ultimately, the 
government.”).   
45. Id.  
46. Since 2007, for example, the government has received more than $680 million in 
seigniorage profits as a result of its “gold” dollar program.  As part of that program, Congress 
directed the Treasury to mint 2.4 billion “dollar coins,” which cost taxpayers about $720 
million to produce.  By selling $1.4 billion of these dollar coins to the public at face value, the 
government has made about $680 million in profit.  Id. (also discussing the Federal Reserve’s 
resistance to purchasing these dollar coins). 
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before and continues to do so to some degree even today. 
II. THE FEDERAL RESERVE AND PRIVATE BANK MONEY CREATION 
SYSTEM 
A.  The Federal Reserve’s Monetary Powers and Policy 
According to its former Chairman, Alan Greenspan, the Federal 
Reserve enjoys an “unlimited power to create money.”47  Congress 
granted this power to the Federal Reserve in Section 16 of the original 
Federal Reserve Act of 1913, which provided: 
Federal Reserve notes, to be issued at the discretion of the Federal 
Reserve Board for the purpose of making advances to Federal 
reserve banks through the Federal reserve agents as hereinafter set 
forth and for no other purpose, are hereby authorized.  The said notes 
shall be obligations of the United States and shall be receivable by 
all national and member banks and Federal reserve banks and for all 
taxes, customs, and other public dues.48 
The modern provision is nearly identical, except that the Federal 
Reserve’s discretionary power to create Notes is even less restricted 
today than it was in 1913 because the Act no longer requires the Federal 
Reserve to maintain a 40% reserve in gold for all notes issued.49  
The Federal Reserve creates, loans, or spends legal tender money 
into existence through a variety of mechanisms, including the discount 
window and open market operations.50  The discount window is not a 
 
47. Greenspan, supra note 15, at 4 (noting relatedly that this power implicates inflation: 
“[I]f central banks effectively insulate private institutions from the largest potential losses, 
however incurred, increased laxity could threaten a major drain on taxpayers or produce 
inflationary instability as a consequence of excess money creation”). 
48. Federal Reserve Act, 38 Stat. 251, 265 (1913) (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 411 
(2013)) (emphasis added). 
49. See 12 U.S.C. § 411 (2013).  The original 1913 provision provided that the Federal 
Reserve Notes “shall be redeemed in gold on demand at the Treasury Department of the 
United States, in the city of Washington, District of Columbia, or in gold or lawful money at 
any Federal reserve bank.”  Federal Reserve Act, 38 Stat. 251, 265 (1913), available at 
http://www.constitution.org/uslaw/sal/038_statutes_at_large.pdf.  To ensure that the Federal 
Reserve could meet this convertibility requirement, Congress originally required it to maintain 
a 40% reserve in gold against Notes actually in circulation and a 35% reserve, also in gold, 
against its deposits.  In addition, it was required to keep a reserve with the Treasury of the 
United States equal to not less than 5% of Notes outstanding, but this reserve could be counted 
as part of the 40% requirement.  Federal Reserve Act, 38 Stat. 251, 266 (1913); see also CARL 
H. MOORE, THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: A HISTORY OF THE FIRST 75 YEARS 35-37 
(1990).  This restriction was eliminated in 1935 along with the convertibility requirement. 
50. MOSS, supra note 16, at 62-64.  The third classic monetary tool of the Federal 
Reserve is the power to set private bank’s reserve rates.  Because the Federal Reserve does not 
directly create or destroy money when it adjusts private banks’ reserve rates, rather it allows 
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literal window, but the mechanism through which the Federal Reserve 
Banks loan created money to banks in exchange for “discounted” assets, 
which the banks pledge as collateral.  Traditionally, banks would pledge 
commercial paper (i.e., business loans owned by the banks) in exchange 
for the created funds.51  Today, the Federal Reserve through its various 
“lending facilities” accepts an increasingly broad array of assets, 
including the mortgage-backed securities that collapsed in trading value 
during the 2008 financial crisis, as collateral for its loans of created 
money.52 
The Federal Reserve also uses created money to purchase assets 
through so-called “open market operations.”  The Federal Open Market 
Committee (FOMC) conducts these outright purchases of assets (to 
expand the money supply) and sales of assets so purchased (to contract 
the money supply).  Traditionally, the FOMC used created money to 
purchase short-term government debt instruments, thereby not only 
manipulating the money supply, but also indirectly supporting federal 
deficit spending.53  Since 2008, however, the FOMC has used 
Congress’s sovereign power to create money to embark on a historically 
unprecedented program of “quantitative easing” (QE).54 
QE is a technical-sounding (and obscuring) term for Central Bank’s 
increasingly popular practice of creating money “out of thin air” to buy 
up a wide range of privately held financial instruments.55  Since 
December 2008, the Federal Reserve has “eased” into existence more 
than $3 trillion through various programs, more than three times the 
amount spent on the Recovery Act during the same period.56  These 
 
the banks to create more or less money; that power and its relevance to the fiscal spending 
debate is discussed separately below. 
51. RONNIE J. PHILLIPS, THE CHICAGO PLAN & NEW DEAL BANKING REFORM 15-18 
(1995) (noting that this approach was consistent with the classic “real bills” doctrine, which 
held that banks should loan money only to facilitate bona fide commercial transactions, which 
were believed to be inherently less risky than other loans, such as real estate loans).   
52. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 32 (providing lists of assets 
accepted as collateral in exchange for Fed-created loans in the wake of the 2008 crisis). 
53. MOORE, supra note 49, at 39.   
54. For full audit report on the Federal Reserve’s activities in the wake of the financial 
crisis, see U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 32. 
55. For a broad discussion of post-2007 central bank quantitative easing, see 
Controlling Interest, ECONOMIST (Sept. 21, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/schools-
brief/21586527-third-our-series-articles-financial-crisis-looks-unconventional (explaining, for 
example, “[p]rinting money to buy assets is known as ‘quantitative easing’ (QE) because 
central banks often announce purchase plans in terms of a desired increase in the quantity of 
bank reserves”). 
56. The Federal Reserve’s “balance sheet” expanded from $925.10 trillion in January 
2008 to $3,504.10 trillion in July 2013.  Monetary Policy Report, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. 
Reserve Sys. (July 17, 2013), http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/mpr-20130717-
part2-accessible.htm#fig47; see also Factors Affecting Reserve Balances,  FED. RESERVE, 
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programs include: QE 1, which lasted from November 2008 to 
November 2010, and through which the Federal Reserve spent $600 
billion in created money to purchase agency mortgage-backed securities 
from struggling financial firms; QE 2, whereby the Federal Reserve 
credited member banks reserve accounts with $75 billion per month in 
unilaterally invented money between November 2010 and June 2011; 
and now QE 3, whereby the Federal Reserve spent into existence $85 
billion per month from December 2012 to December 2013, followed by 
the QE3 “taper,” through which the Federal Reserve created and spent 
$75 billion into the money supply in January 2014, $65 billion per 
month in February and March 2014, and plans to spend $55 billion into 
existence per month from April 2014 until at least June 2014.57 
 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h41/ (last visited May1 4, 2014).  By the end of 
January 2014, the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet expanded to $4 trillion.  Monetary Policy 
Report, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Feb. 11, 2014), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/20140211_mprfullreport.pdf (last visited 
May 14, 2014).  The balance sheet is one way of tracking how much money the Federal 
Reserve has printed into the economy over time.  As a balance sheet, the Federal Reserve’s 
assets and liabilities must always match.  When the Federal Reserve creates currency out of 
nothing and spends or loans it out, it “credits” the liabilities side of the balance sheet (Federal 
Reserve Notes in Circulation or Deposits of Depository Institutions when the created cash is 
deposited in the member banks’ reserve accounts with the Federal Reserve).  At the same 
time, it “debits” the asset side of the balance sheet with an entry representing whatever it 
receives in exchange for the created money (for example, treasury securities or mortgage-
backed securities).  Thus, if the Federal Reserve creates $100 billion to buy U.S. Treasury 
bills from the public, the balance sheet will “expand” by $100 billion.  Specifically, the 
Federal Reserve will credit the liabilities side of the balance sheet with $100 billion (if it used 
physical cash to make the purchase, it would credit the Federal Reserve Notes in Circulation 
“account”; if it used newly created electronic money to purchase the securities, it would credit 
the deposits of depository institutions account).  At the same time, the Federal Reserve would 
debit Treasury Securities account on the assets side of the balance sheet with $100 million 
dollars.  By contrast, if the Federal Reserve simply sold Treasury securities it already owned 
to owners of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) in exchange for those MBS, without creating 
any new money, the sums of two of the asset accounts would change in value, but the overall 
entry for assets would not change and the balance sheet would not “expand” or “contract.”   
57. Mark Gertler & Peter Karadi, QE 1 vs. 2 vs. 3. . . A Framework for Analyzing Large 
Scale Asset Purchases as a Monetary Policy Tool , FED. RESERVE (Mar. 2012), http://www.fe 
deralreserve.gov/Events/conferences/2012/cbc/confpaper1/confpaper1.pdf; The Federal 
Reserve’s response to the financial crisis and actions to foster maximum employment and 
price stability, FED. RESERVE, http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_crisisr 
esponse.htm (describing these measures in more detail) (last visited May 14, 2014).  For a 
thoughtful critique of Central Banks’ newfound endorsement of non-standard monetary 
policy, see Andrew Bowman et al., Central Bank-Led Capitalism?, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 
455, 481 (2013) (characterizing the central bank response as an “on-going system of bank 
welfare”).  As to taper figures, see Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. 
(Dec. 18, 2013), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/201 
31218a.htm; Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Jan. 29, 2014), 
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20140129a.htm; Press 
Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Mar. 19, 2014), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20140319a.htm.  
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Even though the Constitution vests the power to create legal tender 
money exclusively in Congress, the Federal Reserve’s money creation is 
considered legal (or at least non-justiciable) because courts treat the 
Federal Reserve Act as a delegation of Congress’s sovereign monetary 
power to the Federal Reserve.  For example, in Milam v. United States, 
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the legitimacy of Federal Reserve Notes as 
legal tender because “[t]he power so precisely described in [Greenman] 
has been delegated to the Federal Reserve System under the provisions 
of 12 U.S.C. § 411.”58  Similarly, in Walton v. Keim, the Colorado Court 
of Appeals dismissed a taxpayer’s protest suit challenging the legitimacy 
of Federal Reserve Notes, explaining that “Congress has exercised [its 
power to declare things other than gold or silver legal tender for all 
debts] by delegation to the federal reserve system.”  Therefore, “[f]ederal 
reserve notes are legal tender for all debts, including taxes.”59 
Some have challenged this delegation of sovereign powers to a 
quasi-private entity as a violation of the Appointments Clause of the 
Constitution,60 given that (1) many of the voting members of the Federal 
Open Markets Committee are not appointed by the President with the 
advice and consent of the Senate and (2) anyone with the discretionary 
power to create legal tender must be an “Officer of the United States.”  
Although these challenges appear at least colorable, none have 
succeeded, with most being dismissed on political question or standing 
grounds.61 
 
58. 524 F.2d 629, 630 (9th Cir. 1974) (relying on the following passage from Juilliard 
v. Greenman, discussed in Part I, see supra text accompanying notes 22-24, “[u]nder the 
power to borrow money on the credit of the United States, and to issue circulating notes for 
the money borrowed, its power to define the quality and force of those notes as currency is as 
broad as the like power over a metallic currency under the power to coin money and to 
regulate the value thereof. Under the two powers, taken together, Congress is authorized to 
establish a national currency, either in coin or in paper, and to make that currency lawful 
money for all purposes, as regards the national government or private individuals”). 
59. 694 P.2d 1287, 1289 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984) (collecting cases in support of its 
contention that the illegality of paper money had been rejected by every federal and state 
appellate court to have considered it in the preceding fifty years). 
60. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 provides:  
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the 
Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges 
of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose 
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be 
established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such 
inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of 
Law, or in the Heads of Departments. 
61. See Riegle v. Fed. Open Mkt. Comm., 656 F.2d 873, 882 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (“We 
hold that Senator Riegle has standing to bring this action [challenging constitutionality of 
private appointment of members of the Federal Open Market Committee] but exercise our 
equitable discretion to dismiss the case on the ground that judicial action would improperly 
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And so, we come face to face with the uncomfortable tension 
hidden but endemic in contemporary law and discourse regarding 
America’s fiscal/monetary system.  On the one hand, as discussed at the 
outset, we live in a moment of enormous anxiety about federal debt and 
deficits.  Harnessing this anxiety, Congress has insisted that serious cuts 
to federal spending are necessary to make America great again and save 
our children from some unspeakable fiscal nightmare.  Both major 
political parties appear to agree that cuts to essential social safety 
programs, including the Food Stamps program, are a necessary evil on 
the road to the ultimate good of a “balanced budget.”  Whenever the 
prospect of creating money to finance fiscal spending is raised, Congress 
and voters cry ‘inflation!’ and move on to other topics.  And, yet, at the 
same time, the Federal Reserve is exercising Congress’s sovereign 
power to create legal tender money to spend into existence tens of 
billions of dollars a month on top of the money it otherwise creates to 
purchase short-term government securities through the Federal Open 
Market Committee’s traditional operations.  To make matters more 
absurd, the Federal Open Market Committee has cited the recession-
inducing efforts of Congress’s new fiscal restraint as justification for its 
continued expansionary money-creation activities.62  In other words, the 
 
interfere with the legislative process.”); Comm. for Monetary Reform v. Bd. of Governors of 
Fed. Reserve Sys., 766 F.2d 538, 539 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (private businesses and individuals 
who allegedly have suffered financial damage as a result of the money supply policies of the 
Federal Reserve System did not have standing to raise constitutional challenges to the exercise 
of power by the System and to the composition of one of its elements, the Federal Open 
Market Committee); Reuss v. Balles, 584 F.2d 461, 462 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Congressman 
lacked standing as legislator or bondholder to sue seeking declaratory and injunctive relief 
from the allegedly unconstitutional composition of the Federal Open Market Committee, an 
integral component of the Federal Reserve System).  One District Court did reach the merits 
of a Senator’s Appointment Clause claim against the FOMC, holding that the selection of the 
FOMC’s “Reserve Bank members” by private individuals, rather than by President, did not 
violate the Constitution.  Melcher v. Federal Open Market Committee, 644 F.Supp. 510, 517-
24 (D.D.C. 1986).  On appeal, however, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the dismissal on the 
alternative ground that the court should have exercised its equitable discretion not to hear the 
case.  Melcher v. Fed. Open Mkt. Comm., 836 F.2d 561, 562 (D.C. Cir. 1987).  
62. See, e.g., Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (May 1, 2013), 
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20130501a.htm 
(noting that “fiscal policy is restraining economic growth,” and concluding that “[t]o support 
a stronger economic recovery and to help ensure that inflation, over time, is at the rate most 
consistent with its dual mandate” the Committee decided to continue purchasing additional 
agency mortgage-backed securities at a pace of $40 billion per month and longer-term 
Treasury securities at a pace of $45 billion per month); see also BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE 
FED. RESERVE SYS., MONETARY POLICY REPORT 9 (July 17, 2013), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/20130717_mprfullreport.pdf (reporting 
that: “[F]iscal policy changes—including the expiration of the payroll tax cut, the enactment 
of other tax increases, the effects of the budget caps on discretionary spending, the onset of 
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Federal Reserve is exercising Congress’s sovereign power to print 
money to stimulate the economy, at least in part, because Congress is 
refusing to do so itself. 
B.  Private Banks’ Monetary Powers and Policy 
The Federal Reserve is not the only institution creating new money 
and loaning or spending it into the economy.  Under the legal status quo, 
private commercial banks are also permitted to create money or at least 
its very close equivalent.63  Indeed, most of the money in the money 
supply has been created not by Congress and not (at least directly) by the 
Federal Reserve, but by private banks.64  As of February 2014, the 
Federal Reserve reported that the broad money supply (known as “M-
2”), which includes deposits in checking and savings accounts, equaled 
 
the sequestration, and the declines in defense spending for overseas military operations—are 
estimated, collectively, to be exerting a substantial drag on economic activity this year”).  
63. Unlike United States Notes and Federal Reserve Notes, the “money” created by 
banks is not itself legal tender.  See 31 U.S.C. § 5103 (2013) (United States coins and 
currency (including Federal reserve notes and circulating notes of Federal reserve banks and 
national banks) are legal tender for all debts, public charges, taxes, and dues).  But see In re 
Reyes, 482 B.R. 603, 606 (D. Ariz. 2012) (“[A]n interpretation of [§ 5103] to forbid all but 
cash payments ‘would strain logic.’”); Genesee Scrap & Tin Baling Co., Inc. v. City of 
Rochester, 558 F. Supp. 2d 432, 436 (W.D.N.Y. 2008) (ordinance requiring payments by 
check for purchases of scrap metal was not in conflict with § 5103 because it did not “attempt 
to confer legal-tender status upon checks, nor d[id] it deem cash not to be legal tender.”  
Instead, “[a]ll that the Ordinance does is specify the form in which payments for a particular 
category of transactions are to be made. The buyer must pay by check, but that check is a 
promise of payment in legal tender, upon presentation of the check to a bank.”).  As a practical 
matter, however, bank account (demand deposit) money is nearly identical to legal tender 
because it is nearly always and everywhere convertible at par for legal tender, including for 
Federal Reserve Notes.  Moreover, unlike private bank notes of the past, which were 
convertible to specie on demand as long as the bank maintained sufficient specie reserves to 
pay noteholders, modern bank account money is protected by the government, such that the 
likelihood of bank account money losing its convertibility to legal tender money is virtually 
nil.  These protections include Federal Depository Insurance and the Federal Reserve System 
itself, which is authorized to loan created money to banks (in exchange for appropriate 
collateral) when no one else will loan currency to the banks.  
64. See RICHARD S. THORN, INTRODUCTION TO MONEY AND BANKING 85-104 (1976) 
(explaining private banks’ role in the creation of money and noting “[d]emand deposits of 
commercial banks . . . are by far the largest component of the money supply”).  LASTRA, 
supra note 26, at 30-32 (“Commercial banks have an important role in the process of money 
creation: current accounts (demand deposits) are used as means of payment.  Demand deposits 
constitute the major part of the narrow definition of the money supply (M1).  This 
characteristic of bank liabilities provides the rationale for many monetary and banking laws 
and regulations.  The role of banks and other private financial institutions in the creation of 
money cannot be underestimated.”); Wray, supra note 20, at 42 (“[M]ost money used in 
modern society is issued by private financial institutions.”). 
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$11.103 trillion.65  For the same month, the monetary base, which 
consists of all currency physically held by the public and bank reserves, 
was $3.728 trillion.66  Thus, as of February 2014, private banks were 
responsible for transforming $3.833 trillion in monetary base into 
$11.088 trillion in money supply.  Private banks create this money 
through fractional-reserve banking and a process referred to, somewhat 
euphemistically, as the “money-multiplier” effect.67 
It works like this: Individual A deposits $100 into a checking 
account at a private commercial bank (Bank 1).  The Federal Reserve 
has set the reserve rate at 10%.  Therefore, Bank 1 need only retain $10 
of A’s deposit and can loan out or invest the remaining $90.  Assuming 
the bank will seek to make as much money as possible (and it turns out 
we actually cannot assume that),68 the bank lends out $90 of A’s initial 
$100 deposit to B.  Bank 1 can charge B whatever interest rate B is 
willing to pay and Bank 1 gets to keep that money (as well as any 
collateral on the loan should B fail to repay Bank 1).  Meanwhile, A 
continues to behave and believe that she has $100 in her account at Bank 
1 and can withdraw that money at any time.  B takes the $90 loan and 
uses it to purchase goods or services from C.  C deposits his $90 in a 
new bank (Bank 2).  Bank 2 (also subject to the 10% reserve rate) is now 
legally permitted to use $81 of C’s deposit to purchase some mortgage-
backed securities from D.  D, ecstatic to get those virtually unsellable 
mortgage-backed securities off his hands, goes to deposit his $81 into a 
checking account at Bank 3.  Bank 3 is happy to have the money because 
 
65. Federal Reserve Statistical Release: Money Stock Measures, FED. RESERVE, 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h6/current/ (defining M1 and M2 monetary 
aggregates) (last visited May 14, 2014).   
66. Table 1-3, FED. RESERVE (Feb. 6, 2014), http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h 
3/current/h3.htm#a121-53b9045f5.  The monetary base consists of (1) total required reserves 
plus (2) the currency component of the money stock plus (3) excess reserves.   
67. THORN, supra note 64, at 85-104. 
68. The money multiplier assumes that banks will loan out or invest as much money as 
the Federal Reserve (or other applicable regulator) permits them to lend.  In reality, however, 
banks, especially in the wake of the financial crisis, do not always lend out the maximum 
amount of deposits permitted by law.  Instead, banks often retain “excess reserves.”  See 
Aggregate Reserves of Depository Institutions and the Monetary Base-H.3, BD. OF GOV. FED. 
RESERVE (Feb. 20, 2014), http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h3/current/ (Federal 
Reserve report quantifying nominal value of excess reserves currently held by banks and 
showing that as of October 2013, banks held $73,111 million in required reserves, and 
$2,301,847 million in excess reserves).  Economists refer to these excess reserves as well as 
the reality that individuals sometimes prefer to hold their money in cash as “leakages.”  There 
are various theories to explain these leakages, including that banks in an artificially low 
interest rate environment, such as the current one supported by the Fed’s expansive monetary 
policies, prefer to wait until interest rates go up before they loan out excess reserves.  If the 
banks wait to loan out their excess reserves until interest rates increase, banks will be able to 
charge borrowers more for the same loans and receive higher profits. 
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that means it can now loan out or otherwise spend $72.90 of D’s cash 
however it sees fit.  As this process continues, the $100 initially 
deposited into Bank 1 will be expanded into $1000 (assuming a reserve 
rate of 10%).  In other words, the private banking system will have taken 
$100 in new money (narrow money) and created an additional $900 in 
credit money (broad money).69 
Banks have engaged in this practice of creating effective money for 
centuries.70  Initially, banks created effective money or money 
substitutes by printing and lending out bank notes nominally convertible 
to specie (i.e., gold or silver).  This process expanded the money supply 
because the banks created bank notes with nominal values well in excess 
of their stores of specie.  In other words, because the banks chose to 
maintain less specie than would be necessary to redeem all of their 
outstanding notes at any given time, they could “expand” a certain 
amount of gold into a quantity of bank notes with a nominal value many 
times in excess of the bank’s specie holdings.71 
In the United States, this practice became less frequent, at least at 
the state level, when Congress placed a punitive tax on state-chartered 
banks’ notes during the Civil War in an effort to increase demand for the 
Treasury’s Greenbacks.  Adapting to this restriction, banks turned their 
efforts to checkable demand deposit accounts (checking accounts) as a 
means of keeping the game (or “money multiplying”) going.72 
If you are a lawyer or law student and this is the first time you have 
read about how banks create money, you might be asking yourself how 
this practice could possibly reconcile with the principles of the common 
law of property, trusts, contracts, bailments, agency, and/or torts.73  You 
 
69. THORN, supra note 64, at 85-104.  There is even an equation to calculate how much 
bank-created money the Federal Reserve can expect based on the reserve rate: m=1/R.  Where 
m is the “money multiplier” and R is the reserve requirement.  Thus, where the reserve ratio is 
10/100, m = 1/10/100 or 10/1 or 10.  This means that for any dollar invented by the Federal 
Reserve (or coined by Congress) and deposited into the banking system, the private banks 
will—or at least can—loan or spend $10 into the economy. 
70. See generally MARION ARCHIBALD ET AL., MONEY: A HISTORY 34-35 (Jonathan 
Williams ed., 1997); GRAEBER, supra note 11; HIXSON, supra note 32; WHALEN, supra note 
40, at 1-28. 
71. For a concise history of the evolution of money creation in the United States, 
including privately-created money, see Khan, supra note 22, at 408, 430 (noting role of bank 
notes as dominant medium of exchange in the United States prior to the Civil War). 
72. PHILLIPS, supra note 51, at 13-15. 
73. Of course, the textbook description of commercial banking explains the process as a 
simple fee-for-services arrangement.  Professor Thorn, for example, describes commercial 
banks as socially beneficial financial intermediaries connecting those with “surplus-spending 
units” with those with “deficit-spending units” and earning a legitimate profit on the spread 
between the income generated from loans and the expenses paid to depositors.  THORN, supra 
note 64, at 27-46.  This characterization of the role of commercial banks is not inconsistent 
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would not be the first to so wonder.  Bank practices of creating money 
through reserve banking has garnered many legal contests over the years, 
including some successful early challenges.74  After some initial 
resistance, however, courts decided, in many cases more than a century 
ago, that–assuming no agreement to the contrary between the parties–
banks could legally create “money” out of other peoples’ money through 
fractional reserve banking and keep the profits associated with that 
process for themselves. 
As the Supreme Court put it in 1905 in Burton v. United States:75 
     The general transaction between the bank and a customer in the 
way of deposits to a customer’s credit, and drawing against the 
account by the customer, constitute the relation of creditor and 
debtor. . . .  “It is an important part of the business of banking to 
receive deposits; but when they are received, unless there are 
stipulations to the contrary, they belong to the bank, become part of 
its general funds, and can be loaned by it as other moneys.  The 
banker is accountable for the deposits which he receives as a debtor, 
and he agrees to discharge these debts by honoring the checks which 
the depositor shall, from time to time, draw on him.  The contract 
between the parties is purely a legal one, and has nothing of the 
nature of a trust in it.  This subject was fully discussed by Lords 
Cottenham, Brougham, Lyndhurst, and Campbell in the House of 
Lords in the case of Foley v. Hill, 2 H. L. Cas. 28, and they all 
concurred in the opinion that the relation between a banker and 
customer, who pays mo[n]ey into the bank, or to whose credit money 
is placed there, is the ordinary relation of debtor and creditor, and 
does not partake of a fiduciary character, and the great weight of 
American authorities is to the same effect.”76 
Because the bank takes “title” to the moneys once they are 
 
with the contention that banks create money through the very process of loaning out 
depositors’ money.  THORN, supra note 64, at 41 (characterizing the banking system as having 
“dual functions – creating money and acting as a financial intermediary”).  It is also not 
inconsistent with the view that the practice of accepting money from those with surplus-
spending units and loaning it to those with deficit-spending units might be inconsistent with 
the deep principles of the common law to the extent that a depositor does not realize that she is 
giving up title to her money when she deposits it into a checking account and instead believes 
she is giving cash to the bank to keep safe for her later withdrawal.  For additional discussion 
of money and credit in “intermediation,” see ARIE ARNON, MONETARY THEORY AND POLICY 
FROM HUME AND SMITH TO WICKSELL: MONEY, CREDIT, AND THE ECONOMY 161-67 
(Craufurd D. Goodwin ed., 2011). 
74. See Rights of Depositor on Failure of Collecting Bank, 48 BANKING L.J. 361 (1931) 
[hereinafter Rights of Depositor] (providing a review of successful and unsuccessful cases).   
75. 196 U.S. 283, 301-02 (1905). 
76. Id. (quoting Mr. Justice Gray, in National Bank of the Republic v. Millard, 19 L. Ed. 
897, 899 (1869), in speaking of this relationship). 
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deposited, the depositor no longer owns the money as a matter of law, 
and the bank can loan it out or spend it as it pleases.77  If the bank 
manages its deposits unwisely and therefore lacks sufficient reserves to 
honor a depositor’s request for a withdrawal from “his” account, the 
depositor cannot claim that the bank has converted (or stolen) his money 
or committed a tort (in the vein of damaging bailed property) by 
mismanaging his deposited property.  The depositor cannot even claim 
that the bank breached its fiduciary duty to the depositor by imprudently 
or disloyally using the deposited money.  Instead, the depositor stands 
before the bank as a general unsecured creditor, unless he negotiated 
some special terms with the bank in advance of his deposit.  While this 
treatment of the relationship between a depositor and bank might seem 
to strain the limits of credulity, or at least strain the principles of the 
common law, courts had to treat the relationship as such if fractional-
reserve banking was to be considered legal.78 
The contemporary case of Texas State Bank v. United States 
provides a somewhat amusing take on this body of law.79  There, Texas 
State Bank took issue with the Burton v. United States line of authority 
after it was forced by Congress to deposit its reserves with a Federal 
Reserve Bank.  The Texas State Bank argued that the Federal Reserve’s 
earnings on its deposited reserves belonged to it as a matter of law 
because “interest follows principal.”80  The Court dismissed the 
complaint on the merits for failure to state a claim after explaining to the 
 
77. See, e.g., Rights of Depositor, supra note 74, at 363 (quoting Jordan, C.J. in Union 
Nat’l Bank v. Citizens’ Bank, 54 N.E. 97, 100 (1899)) (“The rule which prevails and is 
generally recognized in regard to bank deposits is that where a deposit is made in a bank in the 
ordinary course of business, either of money, or of drafts or checks received and credited as 
money, the title to the money or to the drafts and checks deposited, in the absence of any 
special agreement or direction, passes to the bank, and the relation of debtor and creditor 
arises between the depositor and the bank, without any element of a trust entering into the 
case.  The bank, in such cases acquires title to the money, checks, or drafts deposited, upon the 
implied agreement upon its part to pay full consideration for the same when called upon by the 
depositor in the usual course of business.”). 
78. See, e.g., 8 C.J.S. BAILMENTS § 16 (1988) (“A deposit of money by one person with 
another for safekeeping, and either to be returned to the depositor or paid out on instructions 
of the depositor, is a bailment, and if no provision exists or is contemplated for payment of the 
bailee for the service rendered the bailment is gratuitous.”); 46 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D 
361 (1998) (“It is well-settled that once a bailment contract is created between a bailor and 
bailee, either expressly or by implication, the bailee is charged with a duty of care to protect 
the bailed property from damage or loss.  Although the precise level of care required of the 
bailee can vary with the circumstances and nature of the bailment, when damage, loss or theft 
of the bailed property results from the bailee’s failure to exercise due care, the bailee may be 
held liable to the bailor for damages in an action for breach of bailment contract and/or 
negligence.”). 
79. 423 F.3d 1370, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
80. Id. at 1374 (citation omitted).   
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Bank (an entity that had obviously benefitted from this rule for more 
than a century) that it gave up title to the subject moneys when it 
deposited them into the Federal Reserve’s accounts, and that, as such, 
the bank had no property interest in the income generated by the Federal 
Reserve through its open market operations.81 
C.  Congress and the Federal Reserve’s Roles in Sanctioning and 
Regulating Bank-Created Money 
Prior to 1913, Congress did not directly restrict or support private 
banks’ practice of creating money.  Over the course of the last 100 years, 
however, Congress has become increasingly involved in banks’ money-
creation practices, both extending legal protections to money created 
through the process of fractional-reserve banking and subjecting banks 
to certain federal controls, including reserve rates and capital 
requirements, designed to protect depositors and the economy from the 
instability associated with fractional-reserve banking.82 
Although Congress, as a monetary sovereign, could have responded 
to public concerns over bank panics and economic instability by 
restricting banks’ arguably inherently destabilizing money-creation 
practices, it chose reforms that permitted the practice to continue largely 
unfettered.  For example, the bank-runs associated with the Panic of 
1907 are widely credited with creating the political support for the 
Federal Reserve Act.83  Yet, the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 did not 
restrict private banks’ power to create effective money.  Instead, the Act 
attempted to prevent bank runs by positioning the Federal Reserve as a 
“lender of last resort” and allowing the Federal Reserve to loan printed 
money to any member banks that lacked sufficient reserves to meet 
depositors’ withdrawal demands.84 
When even this fairly dramatic intervention failed to prevent 
 
81. Id. 
82. Jaromir Benes & Michael Kumhof, The Chicago Plan Revisited 5 (International 
Monetary Fund Working Paper No. WP/12/202, 2012), available at http://www.imf.org/exter 
nal/pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp12202.pdf (concluding that fractional-reserve banking contributes to 
the boom and bust cycle and explaining that “[i]n a financial system with little or no reserve 
backing for deposits, and with government-issued cash having a very small role relative to 
bank deposits, the creation of a nation’s broad monetary aggregates depends almost entirely 
on banks’ willingness to supply deposits.  Because additional bank deposits can only be 
created through additional bank loans, sudden changes in the willingness of banks to extend 
credit must therefore not only lead to credit booms or busts, but also to an instant excess or 
shortage of money, and therefore of nominal aggregate demand.”). 
83. PHILLIPS, supra note 51, at 15-18; see also, THORN, supra note 64, at 330-33; 
THOMAS WILSON, THE POWER ‘TO COIN’ MONEY: THE EXERCISE OF MONETARY POWERS 
BY THE CONGRESS 179-186, 208 (1992). 
84. PHILLIPS, supra note 51, at 15-18. 
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destabilizing bank runs in the wake of the stock market crash of 1929, 
Congress and the President again intervened and again declined to 
meaningfully restrict the power of banks to create money.  In 1933, after 
several states unilaterally shut down banks to stop widespread bank runs, 
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s first act as President was to sign an executive 
order declaring a national bank “holiday,” immediately shutting banks 
across the nation.85  At the same time, he called an emergency joint 
session of Congress, which after fourteen days passed the Emergency 
Banking Act of 1933.86  Several other major banking and Federal 
Reserve reforms would soon follow. 
These New Deal banking reforms further legitimized banks’ money 
creation by implementing federal deposit insurance for the first time.87  
While not expressly designating accounting entries in bank deposit 
accounts to be legal tender, this insurance made clear to all that those 
entries (at least up to a certain account balance) would be converted to 
legal tender (i.e., government-produced currency) even in the event of 
bank insolvency.88  As a result, the New Deal legislation extended near-
legal tender status to money unilaterally created by private banks, even 
though Congress had no direct control over when or how the banks 
created or destroyed this legally protected money. 
With the passage of the Bank Act of 1935, Congress gave the 
Federal Reserve the power to set the minimum reserve rates of its 
member banks and thereby limit how much money certain private banks 
could create.89  This reform was proposed by advocates of the Chicago 
 
85. WILSON, supra note 83, at 209. 
86. WILSON, supra note 83, at 209. 
87. PHILLIPS, supra note 51, at 56-57.  
88. PHILLIPS, supra note 51, at 56-57. (“Deposit insurance made banks ‘safe’ not by 
direct restrictions on their assets, but rather by the promise that the government would 
guarantee a percentage of the deposits in all banks, both good and bad.”) (emphasis added); 
see also Morgan Ricks, A Regulatory Design for Monetary Stability, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1289, 
1290-91 (describing core regulatory techniques of the depository sector since the 
establishment of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in 1933 and concluding, 
“[i]n short, U.S. depository banks operate under a public-private partnership regime.”). 
89. PHILLIPS, supra note 51, at 56-57.  The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis explains 
this tool as follows:  
Reserve requirements are the portions of deposits that banks must hold in cash, 
either in their vaults or on deposit at a Reserve Bank.  A decrease in reserve 
requirements is expansionary because it increases the funds available in the 
banking system to lend to consumers and businesses.  An increase in reserve 
requirements is contractionary because it reduces the funds available in the 
banking system to lend to consumers and businesses.  The Board of Governors 
has sole authority over changes to reserve requirements.  The Fed rarely changes 
reserve requirements. 
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Plan, a plan originally introduced by several economists at the 
University of Chicago and later championed by economist Irving Fischer 
to prevent bank runs and promote monetary stability by requiring, 
among other things, 100% reserve banking for all deposit accounts.90  
Advocates concluded that it would be politically unfeasible to directly 
legislate 100% reserve rates for private banks, so they drafted legislation 
amending the Federal Reserve Act to allow the Federal Reserve to set 
member banks’ reserve rates.91 
The Federal Reserve was quick to exercise its new power to 
manipulate reserve rates, not to reduce the swings of the business cycle 
and prevent bank runs as the Chicago Plan advocates had envisioned, but 
rather to prevent inflation.  In 1936, noticing a buildup of excess reserves 
much like those observed on banks’ balance sheets today, the Federal 
Reserve doubled the existing reserve rates.  It justified this move by 
claiming that it must take away banks’ ability to convert those excess 
reserves into a flood of new money in order to prevent a sudden 
inflationary expansion in the money supply.  The banks responded by 
withdrawing even more money from the money supply and restricting 
credit markets further.  The Federal Reserve declined to offset this 
contraction in the money supply with a commensurate increase in the 
volume of government-created money.  Not surprisingly, many experts 
credit this move with extending and worsening the Great Depression.92  
In the wake of that widely panned experiment, the Federal Reserve has 
refrained from using its power to modify the reserve rates much, 
tinkering only at the margins and then usually to lower rates.93 
With the passage of the Monetary Control Act of 1980, the Federal 
 
Educational Resources: How Monetary Policy Works, FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS, 
http://www.stlouisfed.org/inplainenglish/howmonetarypolicyworks.cfm (last visited May 14, 
2014). 
90. PHILLIPS, supra note 51, at 105-14. 
91. PHILLIPS, supra note 51, at 125-28. 
92. GALBRAITH, supra note 33, at 214-15 (noting that reserve requirements were 
increased to eliminate excess reserves after “some durably anxious officials considered what a 
huge volume of loans and deposits [the excess reserves] would sustain were they ever used” 
and that banks responded by stiffening interest rates and reducing outstanding loans, 
concluding that “[t]he combination of restrictive monetary policy and restrictive budget policy 
brought a sharp new recession within the arms, as it were, of a larger depression”); see also, 
e.g., Bruce Bartlett, Are We About to Repeat the Mistakes of 1937?, N.Y. TIMES ECONOMIX 
BLOG (July 12, 2011), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/07/12/are-we-about-to-repeat-
the-mistakes-of-1937/?_r=0 (blaming the recession of 1937 and 1938 on a premature 
combination of fiscal and monetary tightening including the Federal Reserve’s decision to 
double reserve requirements leading to a restriction in credit markets). 
93. See Historical Changes of the Target Federal Funds and Discount Rates, FED. 
RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/statistics/dlyrates/fedrate.html 
(listing the historical reserve rates since 1971) (last visited May 14, 2014). 
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Reserve gained the power to set reserve rates for all banks operating in 
the United States (not just nationally-chartered Federal Reserve member 
banks), but lost the discretion to modify the rates above 14%.94  The 
current reserve rate is 0% for banks with “net transaction accounts” of 
less than $13.3 million, 3% for banks with up to $89 million, and 10% 
for banks with net transaction accounts in excess of $89 million.95  Net 
transaction accounts include demand deposit accounts (i.e., ordinary 
checking accounts).96  Under current law, eligibility for the zero reserve 
rate (i.e., the “reserve requirement exemption”) and for the “low-reserve 
tranche” rate of 3% are set by statutory formula.97  The reserve rate for 
time deposits and savings accounts is 0%.98  The Federal Reserve retains 
the power to set the reserve rate for all other banks (i.e., banks with net 
transaction accounts in excess of the low-reserve tranche, currently 
$89.9 million) at any rate between zero and 14%.99  The last time it 
changed this rate, however, was in 1990, when it revised the reserve rate 
down from 12% to 10%.100 
As such, even though the Federal Reserve has not used this tool 
much recently, it retains the power to manipulate the volume of bank-
created money, at least marginally, by adjusting the reserve rate for most 
banks.101 
 
94. For background on this development as a response to member attrition, see Joshua 
N. Feinman, Reserve Requirements: History, Current Practice, and Potential Reform, FED. 
RESERVE BULLETIN 578 (June 1993), available at  http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetary 
policy/0693lead.pdf.  The Monetary Control Act of 1980 also created the reserve requirement 
exemption and low-reserve tranche categories, which are regulated directly by statute, and 
constrained the range of reserve rates the Federal Reserve could set for remaining banks.  See 
12 U.S.C. § 461(2)(A) (2013) (“Each depository institution shall maintain reserves against its 
transaction accounts . . . in a ratio of not greater than 3 percent (and which may be zero) for 
that portion of its total transaction accounts of $25,000,000 or less, subject to subparagraph 
(C); and . . . in the ratio . . . not greater than 14 per centum (and which may be zero), for that 
portion of its total transaction accounts in excess of $25,000,000 . . . .”).   
95. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Reserve Requirements, FED. RESERVE 
(Nov. 5, 2013) [hereinafter Reserve Requirements], http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetaryp 
olicy/reservereq.htm; see also 12 U.S.C. § 461 (2)(A) (2013). 
96. Reserve Requirements, supra note 95.  
97. Reserve Requirements, supra note 95.  
98. Reserve Requirements, supra note 95.  
99. Reserve Requirements, supra note 95.  
100. Reserve Requirements, supra note 95.  
101. As discussed in more detail infra Part III.A-B, the reserve rate is probably better 
understood as a powerful tool for siphoning privately-created money out of the economy 
rather than an effective means of siphoning or adding money to the money supply.  This is 
because banks are permitted to keep reserves in excess of the reserve rate.  Thus, if the Fed’s 
goal is to increase the money supply, lowering the reserve rate will not always work.  By 
contrast, if the goal is to decrease the money supply, increasing the reserve rate above bank’s 
current reserves will always work, as long as the new reserve rate requires banks to hold more 
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III. TOWARD A NEW PARADIGM FOR THE FEDERAL SPENDING DEBATE 
At present, Congress has ceded its constitutional role in the process 
of creating money to the Federal Reserve and private banks for so long 
and in such a manner that it (and the American people) seems to have 
forgotten that it was ever theirs to begin with.  Under the cloud of this 
collective amnesia and confusion, voters and politicians are engaged in a 
high-stakes debate over the future role of government, with virtually all 
parties to the debate seeming to accept the legally, economically, and 
logically flawed premise that Congress must either cut some spending 
programs or raise taxes to reduce the federal debt and prevent America 
from “going broke.”  While the erroneous basis of this debate alone 
might not merit further inquiry (as people routinely debate matters on 
flawed terms), the federal deficit debate and related pushes for austerity 
measures pose very real dangers to all those who benefit from federal 
spending and all taxpayers. 
Therefore, at the least, Congress should be pressed to acknowledge 
and consider that: (1) it has the constitutional power to create money 
backed by nothing to directly finance its expenses; (2) it is allowing the 
Federal Reserve to create hundreds of billions of dollars a year in fiat 
legal tender money; (3) it is sanctioning and protecting private banks’ 
creation of many more trillions of dollars each year, with–as will be 
discussed presently–questionable public benefits and plausible public 
harm; and (4) consequently, any debate over how to cut the federal debt 
or deficits is in reality a debate about how Congress should exercise its 
sovereign power to create money and who should benefit from that 
power. 
A.  This Fiscal/Monetary System is Not Economically or Politically 
Neutral in That It Creates Predictable Winners and Losers 
Perhaps Congress avoids framing the federal deficit and debt debate 
in terms of its monetary sovereignty because it would rather avoid the 
uncomfortable reality that, like nearly all policy decisions, any 
discretionary exercise of the sovereign power to create money, including 
a decision to continue on the present course or a decision to not exercise 
the power, will necessarily produce winners and losers.102  But, 
 
reserves than they are electing to hold at the time of the increase.  This phenomenon is 
sometimes referred to as the “pushing a string” problem.   
102. In contrast to the framing proposed herein, the consensus quasi-Keynesian view as 
popularly endorsed by many politicians and central bankers allows policymakers to pretend 
that there is some monetary approach that produces only winners (i.e., flooding private banks 
with central-bank created money and pretending the government cannot create money to 
finance its expenses).  This approach to monetary policy, as now widely practiced throughout 
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pretending this is not the case does not make it so.  Indeed, the fact that 
the question presented so forcefully implicates the distribution of wealth 
and power in society makes it all the more important that voters and 
Congress face it head on. 
1. Private Beneficiaries of the Status Quo 
The Federal Reserve is currently exercising Congress’s sovereign 
monetary powers to print trillions of dollars into existence, including $55 
billion per month in the latest round of quantitative easing.103  
Economists have noted that the popularity of this “new monetary 
ideology” probably turns not so much on its effectiveness in terms of 
monetary policy (which remains to be seen and is very much contested 
by experts), but on the fact that quantitative easing is “helpful to the 
financial services and those who work in them.”104  John Kay, a 
Financial Times commentator, explained the situation even more 
bluntly, concluding “[t]he one certain outcome of QE is that those with 
assets benefit relative to those without.”105 
Meanwhile, Congress is almost literally taking food out of the 
mouths of the hungry to save $5 billion a year and perennially 
threatening to order the Treasury to default on government obligations, 
risking further economic crisis, in the name of a problem that is entirely 
within its power to correct. 
Perhaps not surprisingly then, the Centre for Research in Socio-
Cultural Change (CRESC), at the University of Manchester, U.K., after 
examining the distributive effects of Central Banks’ “nonstandard” 
monetary policies in the wake of the 2008 crisis, concluded that Central 
Banks have created “a new and hugely expensive system of bank welfare 
even as social welfare is being cut back in many debt-burdened countries 
 
the world, is purportedly good for everyone because allowing central banks to print money 
and distribute it to private banks and allowing those private banks to create legally-protected 
money and profit richly off of that power drives down interest rates and thereby, eventually, 
increases aggregate investment and reduces unemployment.  This popularly embraced view 
also conveniently justifies Congress’s abdication of its role in deciding the fundamental policy 
question presented by characterizing the setting of monetary policy as an elaborate science, 
separate and apart from the work-a-day dealings of elected representatives.  
103. See supra note 57 and the authorities cited therein; see generally supra Part II.A.  
104. Robert Skidelsky, Quantitative Easing: The New Monetary Ideology, ECONOMIST 
(July 26, 2013), http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2013/07/quantitative-easing 
(noting that quantitative easing is a newly loved means of stimulating the economy even 
though “no one is quite sure how it works”). 
105. John Kay, Quantitative Easing and the Curious Case of the Leaky Bucket, FIN. 
TIMES, July 9, 2013, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/6b0d5268-e7ba-11e2-babb-00144feabdc0 
.html#axzz2jzFy8EvT. 
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like the United Kingdom.”106  Under these new nonstandard monetary 
policies, “which put a floor under high levels of remuneration for 
investment bankers,” CRESC continues, “the order of priorities is 
investment bankers first, shareholders a poor second, and the public 
nowhere, even though taxpayers are either paying for or are liable for 
everything that the central bankers do.”107 
These benefits of the present monetary system to the financial 
sector are not limited to the post-2008 asset purchasing programs.  Even 
before the 2008 financial crisis, when most of the Federal Reserve’s 
created money went to purchase federal debt instruments, the monetary 
system ensured that various “middlemen,” including banks and large 
investors, profited mightily from the government’s practice of essentially 
borrowing money from itself.  Even one-time Federal Reserve 
Chairman, Marriner Eccles, found this aspect of the system 
“outrageous.”108 
 
106. Bowman et al., supra note 57, at 482. 
107. Bowman et al., supra note 57, at 482 (explaining, among other things, how 
quantitative easing and other Central Bank “improvisations” have allowed the velocity of 
trading to continue even while the profitability of investment instruments has plummeted, 
benefitting investment bankers who are often paid based on the volume of activity, with little 
benefit to equity holders); see also Ricks, supra note 88, at 1303 (“It is no exaggeration to say 
that practically the entire emergency policy response to the recent crisis was aimed at 
stabilizing the market for private money-claims.”); Felix Salmon, Chart of the Day: U.S. 
Financial Profits, REUTERS-U.S. (Mar. 30, 2011), http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-
salmon/2011/03/30/chart-of-the-day-us-financial-profits/ (noting that financial industry profits 
are roaring back to more than 30% of all domestic US profits, which is “an amazing share 
given that the sector accounts for less than 10% of the value added in the economy”); 
Kathleen Madigan, Like the Phoenix, U.S. Business Profits Soar, WALL ST J., Mar. 25, 2011, 
http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2011/03/25/like-the-phoenix-u-s-finance-profits-soar/; 
Lawrence Hunter, Is the Federal Reserve Using Money Laundering Techniques to Cleanse 
Banks’ Balance Sheets?, FORBES (Oct. 29, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/lawrencehunter 
/2012/10/29/are-federal-reserve-regulated-banks-laundering-dirty-money/; accord, RON PAUL, 
END THE FED 14 (2009) (“What the largest banks desire is precisely what we might expect 
any large corporation to desire:  privatized profits and socialized losses.  The privatized profits 
come from successful loan activities, sometimes during economic booms.  But when the boom 
turns to bust, the losses are absorbed by third parties and do not affect the bottom line.  To 
cover losses requires a supply of money that stretches to meet bankers’ demands.  This is 
something that every industry would like if they could get it.  But it is something that the free 
market denies them, and rightly so.”). 
108. Journalist William Greider characterized Chairman Eccle’s critique of this aspect 
of the monetary system, as follows:  
The periodic Victory bond drives staged by Treasury [which are 
indistinguishable from any other Treasury security issues, for purposes of this 
critique] meant ‘outrageous profits’ for banks and large investors because the 
arrangement allows a daisy-chain exploitation of the Fed’s money creation.  To 
ensure a successful bond sale and stable interest rates, the Fed expanded bank 
reserves by buying up outstanding government securities.  The commercial banks 
lent the expanded money supply to private customers who would in turn lend it 
to the government by buying the new Treasury issues.  The customers then sold 
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The Federal Reserve System itself (in contrast to the private banks 
that benefit from the Federal Reserve System) does not reap significant 
profits from its activities.  Instead, it is required by statute to send 6% of 
its annual profits to its “owners” (private banks) as a dividend and the 
remainder of profits to the U.S. Treasury.109  Of course, individuals 
within the Federal Reserve System can and do “profit” in other ways 
from the Federal Reserve’s power to create money.  A 2011 General 
Accountability Office Audit of the Federal Reserve’s activities, for 
example, identified a widespread failure of the system to properly screen 
its employees for conflicts of interest and a troubling “revolving door” 
policy whereby employees of the Federal Reserve System and the 
private banking sector (where inside knowledge of Federal Reserve 
practices would be considered very valuable) frequently transferred 
between the two sectors.110 
2. Claimed Public Benefits of the Status Quo 
Proponents of the status quo tout its many supposed public benefits.  
For example, proponents argue that allowing private banks to create 
money through the practice of fractional-reserve banking ensures cheap 
credit for consumers and investors and “free” banking services.111  If 
banks were required to maintain full (or even higher) reserves, they 
argue, they would have to charge customers higher interest rates on loans 
and fees for checking and settlement services. 
Similarly, proponents of the Federal Reserve System note that the 
Federal Reserve is required by statute to exercise its power to create (and 
destroy) money to maximize employment and promote stable prices, 
goals that are at least presumably in the public interest.  Proponents also 
 
their new government securities to the commercial banks – and they eventually 
sold them back to the Fed when the central bank was again required to expand 
the money supply.  In a roundabout way, the government was borrowing its own 
money – and paying a fixed fee to middlemen for the privilege. 
WILLIAM GREIDER, THE SECRETS OF THE TEMPLE: HOW THE FEDERAL RESERVE RUNS THE 
COUNTRY 323 (1988).   
109. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Current FAQs: Who Owns the Federal 
Reserve?, FED. RESERVE (Aug. 2, 2013), http://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/about_14986.h 
tm; Binyamin Appelbaum, Fed Profit of $88.9 Billion Sent to Treasury in 2012, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 10, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/11/business/economy/feds-2012-profit-was-
88-9-billion.html?_r=0. 
110. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 32 (containing various 
recommended reforms to correct this situation).   
111. See, e.g., PHILLIPS, supra note 51, at 181-89 (discussing pros and cons of 100% 
reserve banking); cf. Ricks, supra note 88, at 1292 (discussing “immense economic value” of 
depository banks and other money-claim issuers that channel economic agents’ pooled cash 
reserves into the capital markets, and “do so without compromising the ‘moneyness’ of those 
cash reserves”). 
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claim that the Federal Reserve can and has prevented economic crises, 
recessions, and depressions, by injecting the money supply with new 
money when necessary to stimulate economic activity.  More broadly, 
proponents of the status quo argue that the System’s supply of easy 
money ensures an elastic money supply, a “healthy” level of inflation, 
and “grease” for the economy, all of which enable maximum 
employment and flexible responses to financial and other economic 
shocks. 
Of course, these arguments are only as persuasive as their factual 
predicates are accurate.  Opponents of fractional-reserve banking point 
out that simple commercial banking services could be provided at 
minimal cost, for example at U.S. post offices, and that cheap credit 
could be supported by publicly created money just as well as by 
privately created money.112 
Opponents of the Federal Reserve System point out that the macro-
economy is far too complex to be predictable or singularly controlled.113  
Opponents also argue (sometimes relatedly) that the Federal Reserve’s 
actions have actually caused and contributed to economic crises in the 
past as often as they have prevented them and that the Federal Reserve’s 
conduct is likely contributing to future financial instability even now.114 
 
112. See generally PHILLIPS, supra note 51, at 40-41 (noting wide support, including 
Justice Louis D. Brandeis, for the expansion of the postal savings system to function as public 
banks).  Senator Elizabeth Warren recently endorsed a similar idea as a remedy to a problem 
identified by the Office of the Inspector General: “68 million Americans . . . have no checking 
or savings account and are underserved by the banking system.”  Elizabeth Warren, Coming to 
a Post Office Near You: Loans You Can Trust?, HUFFINGTON POST, Feb. 1, 2014, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/elizabeth-warren/coming-to-a-post-office-n_b_4709485.html.  
113. See, e.g., EDWARD ELGAR, THE ELGAR COMPANION TO POST-KEYNESIAN 
ECONOMICS 5-9 (J. E. King 2003) (discussing Austrian School of Economics and Friedrich 
von Hayek’s view that the dispersed, partial, continually changing, and frequently 
contradictory information possessed by different economic agents in any advanced economy 
make it impossible for governments to direct economic activity with any semblance of 
economic efficiency); HETERODOX , supra note 19 (discussing the role of fundamental 
uncertainty in the economy and the endogenous (rather than exogenous) nature of 
macroeconomic forces, including interest rates, money supply, and inflation).  
114. As to the role of Federal Reserve in contributing to economic crises, see, most 
famously, MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA JACOBSON SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF 
THE UNITED STATES, 1867-1960 (1963) (blaming the depth and length of the Great 
Depression on the Federal Reserve’s contemporaneous conduct); Ben Bernanke, Governor, 
Fed. Reserve Bd., Remarks at the Conference to Honor Milton Friedman on His 90th 
Birthday, Univ. of Chicago, Chicago, Ill. (Nov. 8, 2002), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/BOARDDOCS/SPEECHES/2002/20021108/ (containing a 
summary of Friedman and Schwartz’ work and concluding, “You’re right, we [i.e., the Federal 
Reserve] did it.  We’re very sorry.  But thanks to you, we won’t do it again.”); ELLEN FRANK, 
THE RAW DEAL: HOW MYTHS AND MISINFORMATION ABOUT THE DEFICIT, INFLATION, AND 
WEALTH IMPOVERISH AMERICA 142-152 (2004) (concluding that the Federal Reserve’s 
efforts to control inflation during the 1980s and 90s contributed to financial volatility that fed 
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Although it is not so frequently touted as such, another public 
benefit of the status quo is that it allows the federal government to 
indirectly print money to pay for some of its deficit spending because the 
Federal Reserve sometimes uses its power to print money to purchase 
and effectively extinguish some government debt.115 
In ordinary political times, these purported public benefits of the 
present system might be sufficient to pass some minimal legitimacy 
threshold and assuage at least superficial concerns about the prudence 
and fairness of the present fiscal/monetary system.  But, these are not 
ordinary political times, as the legally unnecessary federal debt has 
triggered public alarm, resulting in widespread cuts to federal spending, 
including cuts to essential social safety net programs.  Thus, the current 
method of using Federal Reserve and bank-created money to extinguish 
(at least some of) the federal debt and to thereby indirectly use created 
money to pay for federal spending is not just inefficient (if the goal is 
simply to finance federal spending), it is also dangerous because it 
enables widespread confusion about the legal and economic nature of 
sovereign money and debt.  To the extent that the complexity of the 
present system and the opaque jargon of contemporary discourse on 
monetary policy sow confusion in the electorate and in government 
about the nature of sovereign money and debt, the status quo is also 
profoundly hazardous to those that benefit from direct federal spending, 
as the widespread confusion over the legal and economic nature of 
 
stock bubbles and exacerbated inequality).  For a view that the Federal Reserve’s 
contemporary economic interventions may be contributing to future financial crises through 
the creation/re-inflation of credit and asset bubbles, see, e.g., Nouriel Roubini, Is the Fed 
Blowing Bubbles?, PROJECT SYNDICATE (May 5, 2013, 7:15 AM), http://www.slate.com/artic 
les/business/project_syndicate/2013/05/the_fed_faces_a_tricky_exit_from_its_third_round_of
_quantitative_easing.html.   
115. See, e.g., THORN, supra note 64, at 116-17 (“although the direct issue of currency 
by the government is relatively small, an overwhelming portion of the monetary base issued 
by the Federal Reserve (bank reserves) is an indirect issue of the government (because it is 
issued in exchange for outstanding government debt).  This fact, more than the small amount 
of currency issued by the Treasury, justifies linking together of the government and the central 
bank as the monetary authorities.”); see also THORN, supra note 64, at 127 (federal 
“borrowing from the Federal Reserve is almost costless, since the Federal Reserve System 
turns over all of its excess earnings to the Treasury”); CARL E. WALSH, MONETARY THEORY 
AND POLICY 144 (2d ed. 2003) (“An open market purchase increases the stock of money, but 
by reducing the interest-bearing government debt held by the public, it has implications for the 
future stream of taxes needed to finance the interest cost of the government’s debt.  So an 
open market operation potentially has a fiscal side to it[.]”); Wray, supra note 20, at 47-48 (“It 
is commonly believed that fiscal policy faces a budget constraint such that its spending must 
be ‘financed’ by taxes, borrowing (bond sales) or ‘money creation.’  Since many nations 
prohibit direct ‘money creation’ by the government’s treasury, the last option is possible only 
through complicity of the central bank – which buys the government’s bonds, financing 
deficits by ‘printing money.’”). 
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sovereign money and debt frustrates the democratic process and prevents 
Congress from squarely and openly evaluating the costs and benefits of 
the status quo and its alternatives.116 
B.  What Could We Do Instead? 
The Constitution entrusts the power to exercise the nation’s 
monetary sovereignty to Congress.  Unlike many countries,117 the 
Federal Reserve System and its sanctioning of fractional-reserve banking 
is not incorporated into the U.S. Constitution.  Therefore, Congress 
could change the status quo with a simple majority vote and the 
signature of the President. 
Alternative models have already been developed, including the 
National Emergency Employment Defense Act (NEED Act), which was 
introduced in the House of Representatives in 2010 and 2011 by 
Representative Dennis Kucinich.  The NEED Act would both ban 
fractional-reserve banking and take the power to create money back from 
the Federal Reserve, vesting that power in a new monetary authority 
under the direct control of the U.S. Treasury.118  As such, the NEED Act 
is not dissimilar to earlier efforts to return the exercise of the sovereign 
power over money creation to Congress, including the Greenback 
Party’s proposals and the Chicago Plan for full reserve banking, 
discussed supra. 
Congress should consider the costs and benefits of this and similar 
proposals.  A recent IMF working paper, for example, concluded that 
adoption of the Chicago Plan would not just result in a “dramatic 
 
116. To the extent that confusion over the nature of sovereign money and debt has 
contributed to austerity measures, the status quo is not just damaging to the poor, but to the 
economy more generally, and, therefore (ironically), to the fiscal budget.  See Stimulus v. 
Austerity, Sovereign Doubts, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 28, 2013, at 72 (discussing the 
counterproductive nature of austerity, which typically results in more losses to the government 
in the form of lost tax revenue than savings to the government in the form of lower 
expenditures because the austerity measures themselves dampen economic growth and 
therefore reduce tax revenue).   
117. See, e.g., Eva Gutierrez, Inflation Performance and Constitutional Central Bank 
Independence: Evidence From Latin America and the Caribbean 16 (Int’l Monetary Fund, 
Working Paper No. WP/03/53, 2003), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/20 
03/wp0353.pdf (identifying Chile, Brazil, Paraguay, Mexico, and Peru as enshrining central 
bank “independence” into their respective constitutions during the 1980s in an effort to curb 
inflation). 
118. H.R. 2990, 112th Cong. (2011) (stating that the purpose of the Act is to: “create a 
full employment economy as a matter of national economic defense; to provide for public 
investment in capital infrastructure; to provide for reducing the cost of public investment; to 
retire public debt; to stabilize the Social Security retirement system; to restore the authority of 
Congress to create and regulate money, modernize and provide stability for the monetary 
system of the United States; and for other public purposes”). 
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reduction of the (net) public debt,” but also allow: 
(1) Much better control of a major source of business cycle 
fluctuations, sudden increases and contractions of bank credit and of 
the supply of bank-created money; (2) Complete elimination of bank 
runs; . . . [(3)] Dramatic reduction of private debt, as money creation 
no longer requires simultaneous debt creation; [(4)] [Economic] 
output gains approach[ing] 10 percent [; all while (5)] steady state 
inflation can drop to zero without any problems for the conduct of 
monetary policy.119 
When considering these proposals, Congress should also 
understand that while such measures would certainly succeed in 
restoring Congress to its constitutional role over money creation and 
may promise additional benefits beyond immediate debt-free federal 
financing, such as those just identified, such wholesale reform is likely 
not necessary to allow further federal deficit spending without increased 
inflationary risks. 
The Supreme Court has made clear that Congress has the 
constitutional power to create fiat money and declare it legal tender.  
Congress has exercised this power in the past, including after the Civil 
War, when it granted Treasury the power to issue fiat “greenbacks” and 
declared those fiat dollars legal tender.  As that historical episode makes 
clear, Congress does not have to prohibit banks from creating money 
before it allows itself to create money.  Just as during the late 19th 
century, today’s Congress could pass a statute directing the Treasury to 
issue additional United States Notes (beyond the $300 million currently 
authorized) at the same time that Congress allows the Federal Reserve 
(then, the National Banks) to issue Federal Reserve Notes.  Under 
existing law, both forms of currency would be legal tender for the 
payment of all debts public and private and redeemable at par for one 
another.120 
Of course, Congress might fear inflation if it joins the Federal 
Reserve and private-banks in the money creation business.  Therefore, 
before authorizing the Treasury to create and spend more legal tender 
 
119. Benes & Kumhof, supra note 82, at 1. 
120. 31 U.S.C. § 5103 (2013) (“United States coins and currency (including Federal 
reserve notes and circulating notes of Federal reserve banks and national banks) are legal 
tender for all debts, public charges, taxes, and dues. Foreign gold or silver coins are not legal 
tender for debts”); id. at § 5119 (listing United States currency notes and Federal Reserve 
Notes as non-interest bearing public debts); U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, supra note 39 
(stating that “[s]ince [U.S. Notes were made irredeemable for gold], both currencies [i.e. both 
U.S. Notes and Federal Reserve Notes] have served essentially the same purpose, and have 
had the same value”); see also, e.g., Khan, supra note 22. 
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money, Congress might feel compelled to prohibit or restrict the Federal 
Reserve or private bank’s money creation powers.  Given the power and 
wealth that is at stake, we can be sure that such efforts would be fiercely 
opposed.121  But, if the Federal Reserve abides by its existing statutory 
mandate, Congress would not necessarily have to touch the Federal 
Reserve Act.  The Federal Reserve Act provides the Federal Reserve 
with a “dual mandate” to “maintain stable prices and ensure maximum 
employment.”122  Congress has empowered the Federal Reserve with a 
variety of tools to meet these goals, including (as discussed) the power to 
create money to sell or lend into existence and the power to take money 
out of the money supply (through open market operations, the discount 
window, and through the reserve rate for private banks).  Thus, to the 
extent that congressional money printing triggered undesirable rates of 
inflation, the Federal Reserve would at least arguably be required by its 
existing mandate to use its very powerful tools to temper inflation.123 
Because the Federal Reserve and private banks currently create so 
much of the money in the money supply, there is plenty of room for the 
Federal Reserve to adjust.  For example, if Congress printed the $1.086 
trillion necessary to fund the federal deficit for fiscal year 2013, the 
Federal Reserve could remove a corresponding amount from the money 
supply by either ceasing QE 3 (which pumped $1.02 trillion in created 
money into the economy in 2013), reducing the volume of money it 
otherwise spends or loans into creation through its open market 
operations, or by increasing private banks’ reserve rates. 
Thus, while it is not at all certain that the Federal Reserve would 
have to change anything to accommodate congressionally printed money 
because (as discussed at the outset) inflation does not necessarily result 
 
121. See supra Part III.A (discussing the private beneficiaries of the present monetary 
system). 
122. 12 U.S.C. § 225a (2013) (“The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
and the Federal Open Market Committee shall maintain long run growth of the monetary and 
credit aggregates commensurate with the economy’s long run potential to increase production, 
so as to promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate 
long-term interest rates.”); see also The Federal Reserve’s Dual Mandate,  FED. RESERVE 
BANK CHI. (Feb. 14, 2014), http://www.chicagofed.org/webpages/publications/speeches/our_ 
dual_mandate.cfm (characterizing this provision as providing the Fed with its “dual 
mandate”).  
123. Chairwoman of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, Janet Yellen, appears to 
agree both that the Federal Reserve’s primary goal is to maintain price stability and that it is 
within the power of the Federal Reserve to do so.  See Janet L. Yellen, Bd. of Governors of 
the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at the Nat. Ass’n of Bus. Economists, Washington, D.C. *1 
(March 13, 1996) (transcript available on Westlaw, at 1996 WL 111362 (F.R.B.)) (“In my 
view, the appropriate primary long-term goal for the Federal Reserve should be price stability, 
an objective which no one would deny is within the power of the central bank to 
accomplish.”).  
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from governments spending created money into the economy, Congress 
could print money to finance the entire federal deficit without touching 
the Federal Reserve Act and without necessarily causing any even 
potentially inflationary increase in the quantity of money in the money 
supply. 
Of course, there are numerous and serious policy implications 
associated with such an approach, including potentially dramatic effects 
on private credit markets and interest rates.  For example, if the Federal 
Reserve were to suddenly stop using printed money to drive down 
interest rates, it is possible that interest rates on private loans would 
increase dramatically.  This is by no means certain, however, especially 
if Congress offsets the Federal Reserve’s decrease in money creation 
with its own money creation (thereby stabilizing the “supply” of money).  
In addition, if private banks were no longer permitted to loan out all or 
nearly all of their deposits, they would have to choose between reduced 
profits and charging customers higher interest rates for private loans.  
Assuming the banks chose the latter, loans, including home mortgages, 
could become scarcer and more expensive.  This may not be a bad thing, 
though, given that the availability of cheap and easy mortgages is often 
credited with contributing to the 2009 financial crisis by facilitating a 
housing (and mortgage-backed securities) bubble.  Moreover, to the 
extent Congress wants to keep home financing and other loans 
affordable, it could offset this effect on the credit markets by providing 
direct lending to the public. 
A full exploration of these policy implications is outside the scope 
of this Article.  I raise them here, as I have raised everything, in the 
hopes of starting the conversation, not concluding it.  My goal is not to 
say how Congress’s monetary sovereignty should be exercised, but 
simply to show that the contemporary, popular discourse on the nature of 
the federal debt is profoundly flawed, relying on assumptions that are 
false as a matter of law and logic and to propose an alternative paradigm 
for that discussion moving forward.  As maintained throughout, that new 
paradigm must recognize that Congress has the sovereign power to 
create money, that the Federal Reserve and private banks are exercising 
that power on behalf of Congress to create trillions of dollars in new 
effective money each year, and that, therefore, the question presented to 
Congress by historically high federal deficits and debt and related fiscal 
anxiety is not simply what can we learn to live without.  The question, 
whether Congress knows it or not, is: how should the peoples’ sovereign 
power to create money be exercised and who should benefit from the 
exercise of that power?  Even if the answer to that question is that the 
status quo should be maintained, I suspect that voters would not be so 
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afraid of federal spending if they understood the real nature of the 
present fiscal/monetary system.  They might even muster the political 
will to demand a fully funded Food Stamps program. 
